When Counsel’s Bias Becomes a Conflict: Commonwealth v. Badgett and the Right to Unconflicted Representation in Massachusetts
Introduction
In the recent decision Commonwealth v. Badgett, the Massachusetts Appeals Court reversed a denial of a new-trial motion and ordered the defendant’s guilty plea vacated on the ground that his appointed counsel harbored racial bias against Black persons that constituted an “actual conflict of interest.” The case is a powerful reminder of the promise at the heart of both the Sixth Amendment and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: that a criminal defendant is entitled to representation free from divided loyalties and uninhibited by counsel’s personal prejudices.
For criminal defense lawyers in the Brockton and Boston areas, Badgett offers an important lesson about how bias—though not overtly directed at a client—can nonetheless corrode the integrity of plea proceedings and compromise a lawyer’s undivided duty of loyalty.
This post will:
Outline the facts of Badgett;
Explain the legal standards governing conflicts of interest and waiver;
Analyze the Appeals Court’s reasoning;
Discuss implications for defense practice; and
Conclude with a practical Q&A for clients and attorneys.
Factual Background
Ronald Badgett was indicted in April 2017 on four firearms offenses: unlawful possession of a firearm without a license, unlawful possession of a large-capacity feeding device, possession of ammunition without a license, and carrying a loaded firearm without a license. He also faced two habitual-offender enhancements.
After arraignment, Badgett requested new counsel. In September 2017, Richard Doyle was appointed to represent him. That same month, the Committee for Public Counsel Services (CPCS) began investigating the Attorney after discovering numerous racist and bigoted social-media posts in which he expressed hatred and scorn toward Muslims, Black people, undocumented immigrants, and transgender persons. He had also publicly referred to his clients as “thugs” and “punks,” often implying they were criminals. CPCS concluded that the Arttorney’s postings violated his duty of loyalty to his nonwhite and Muslim clients and suspended him for one year.
On December 27, 2017, Badgett signed a “choice of counsel” form electing to keep the Attorney despite the CPCS findings. The form stated that CPCS had determined the Attorney held a bias against “people who do not appear to be Caucasian (white)” and that this created an actual conflict of interest, but also noted that Doyle was contesting those findings. The form did not describe the risks or advantages of either choice.
In February 2018, Doyle negotiated a plea agreement under which Badgett pleaded guilty to three of the four firearm counts. the Attorney failed to appear at sentencing, and another lawyer stood in.
Badgett later filed two motions for a new trial—one in 2020 and another in 2022—arguing that the Attorney’s racism created an actual conflict of interest that denied him effective assistance of counsel. Both motions were denied by the Superior Court. The Appeals Court reversed.
Legal Framework: Conflict, Effective Assistance, and Waiver
The Right to Counsel
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution and Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights guarantee criminal defendants the right to the “untrammeled and unimpaired assistance of counsel free of any conflict of interest.” Under Article 12, Massachusetts provides broader protection than the federal constitution: if an actual conflict exists, the defendant is entitled to relief without showing specific prejudice.
What Constitutes an Actual Conflict
An “actual conflict” exists where “prejudice is inherent in the situation, such that no impartial observer could reasonably conclude that the attorney is able to serve the defendant with undivided loyalty.” The Massachusetts Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.7(a), similarly forbid representation where there is a significant risk that a lawyer’s personal interest will materially limit the representation.
In Commonwealth v. Dew (2023), the Supreme Judicial Court held that Doyle’s racism and religious bias toward a Black Muslim client created an actual conflict. But Dew left open a question: would the same conclusion hold if no outward manifestation of bias occurred during the representation? Badgett answers that question yes.
Waiver of Conflict
Even if a conflict exists, a defendant can consent to continued representation only if the waiver is voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. The waiver must be clear and unambiguous, and counsel must explain in detail the risks of conflicted representation, available alternatives, and potential disadvantages. A simple written form is insufficient without meaningful discussion. A judicial colloquy is considered best practice to confirm that the waiver is valid.
The Court’s Reasoning
1. Actual Conflict
The Appeals Court found that the Attorney’s racist and bigoted social-media activity, which overlapped with his representation of Badgett, created an actual conflict of interest. Although Doyle did not make overtly racist remarks to Badgett, the posts—some of which were made during the same period—reflected “extreme racial bias toward Black persons” and specifically mocked Black men accused of gun crimes.
The court wrote that, in such circumstances, “we cannot presume zealous advocacy.” It concluded that an impartial observer could not reasonably believe Doyle was capable of representing Badgett with undivided loyalty. The intensity and public nature of the Attorney’s posts meant that prejudice was inherent in the relationship.
Importantly, the court held that Dew does not require evidence of overt racism directed at the defendant himself. The mere existence of publicly expressed, virulent bias against a class to which the client belongs is enough to constitute an actual conflict.
The decision emphasizes the systemic importance of this principle: “Public confidence in the integrity of the criminal justice system is essential to its ability to function.” Racist and bigoted behavior by defense counsel, the court said, not only harms the individual client but also erodes the public’s trust in the fairness of the system.
2. Invalid Waiver
Next, the Appeals Court examined whether Badgett’s waiver of the conflict was valid. It was not.
The “choice of counsel” form that Badgett signed merely stated that the Attorney had been found to have a bias against nonwhite persons and that Doyle disputed those findings. The Attorney told Badgett the allegations were false. Nothing in the record showed that the Attorney—or anyone else—explained the details of the investigation, the nature of the conflict, or the risks of continuing with him as counsel.
The court contrasted this with Commonwealth v. Perkins, where a valid waiver existed because the Attorney had carefully explained the risks and the defendant demonstrated clear understanding. In Badgett, no such explanation occurred. The form alone did not establish that Badgett made an informed choice.
The court noted that no judge conducted a colloquy on the record, which might have clarified whether the defendant understood his rights. Without that safeguard, the waiver failed.
3. Remedy
Because the Attorney’s racism constituted an actual conflict and the waiver was invalid, the court reversed the denial of the new-trial motion, vacated Badgett’s convictions, and ordered that he be allowed to withdraw his guilty plea.
Why Badgett Matters
Extends Conflict Doctrine
Badgett expands the concept of “actual conflict.” Even absent overt discriminatory conduct, publicly expressed racism by counsel can create an inherent conflict if the defendant belongs to the targeted group.Applies to Plea Cases
The case confirms that the right to conflict-free counsel applies not just at trial but during plea bargaining and sentencing—critical stages where effective representation determines outcome.Raises Waiver Standards
A valid waiver of conflict requires detailed explanation and meaningful understanding. Written acknowledgment alone is insufficient.Protects Public Confidence
By explicitly linking counsel bias to public trust, the decision reinforces the judiciary’s responsibility to ensure not only actual fairness but the appearance of fairness.Clarifies Role of Oversight Agencies
CPCS had already investigated the Attorney’s misconduct. The case underscores the need for prompt communication of such findings to judges and defendants, and for courts to conduct colloquies before allowing conflicted counsel to continue.
Lessons for Defense Counsel
Conduct Thorough Conflict Checks
Defense attorneys must evaluate whether any personal opinions, public statements, or relationships could create conflicts. Online conduct now falls squarely within that obligation.Document Informed Consent
If a client chooses to proceed despite a potential conflict, counsel should provide detailed written explanations and, where possible, ask the court to confirm understanding on the record.Recognize Bias as an Ethical Conflict
Bias—racial, religious, gender-based, or otherwise—is not just unprofessional; it creates a material limitation under Rule 1.7(a) and may nullify convictions or pleas.Protect the Record
Defense lawyers should request that any conflict discussion be memorialized. If a case later involves post-conviction litigation, a complete record helps show that any waiver was knowing and voluntary.Be Candid with Clients
The Badgett opinion highlights the ethical duty to tell the client the truth about risks. Denying or minimizing the existence of a conflict, as Doyle did, undermines that duty and endangers the client’s conviction.
Implications for Courts and Prosecutors
For Judges: When conflicts are disclosed, especially involving public findings of bias, judges should inquire directly of the defendant to ensure understanding and voluntary consent.
For Prosecutors: While conflicts arise within the defense relationship, prosecutors have a stake in ensuring convictions rest on sound representation. Cases later overturned for conflicts waste resources and harm public confidence.
For Oversight Bodies: CPCS and other appointing authorities must act swiftly to prevent conflicted counsel from representing clients of groups against whom they harbor animus.
What Badgett Means for Clients
For defendants facing serious charges—especially firearms or habitual-offender cases—the decision carries clear lessons:
You have an absolute right to an attorney who is loyal to you alone, not influenced by personal bias or divided commitments.
You have the right to be told about any conflict and to receive a clear explanation of your choices.
You are not required to accept a lawyer who has shown bias against your race, religion, or identity.
If you discover after conviction that your attorney was under investigation for bias, you may have grounds to withdraw your plea or seek a new trial.
The fairness of the system depends not only on what happens in court but on the integrity of those who represent you.
Broader Themes
Badgett fits within a growing line of Massachusetts decisions that view attorney bias as an ethical and constitutional issue, not merely a matter of poor professionalism. It continues a jurisprudential shift toward acknowledging that racism within the defense bar harms clients and the justice system alike.
This approach also reflects Massachusetts’ distinctive commitment to Article 12’s broader protections, which eliminate the need to prove prejudice once an actual conflict is shown. The presumption of prejudice reflects an understanding that bias corrodes loyalty in ways too subtle to measure but too serious to ignore.
The court’s opinion, authored by Justice Smyth, carries a moral as well as legal weight: public trust depends on the assurance that no defendant must rely on a lawyer who despises him.
Conclusion
The Badgett decision reaffirms a cornerstone principle of Massachusetts criminal law: the right to counsel is the right to loyal counsel. A lawyer’s prejudice—especially when publicly displayed—can itself destroy that loyalty.
For defense lawyers, the message is clear. Professional ethics demand not only technical competence but integrity and fairness. For defendants, the case offers reassurance that courts will not tolerate representation tainted by bias. And for the justice system as a whole, Badgett stands as a reminder that fairness must be both actual and apparent.
In Massachusetts, particularly under Article 12, no conviction or plea can stand when the lawyer’s own prejudice stands in the way of loyalty.
Q&A: Understanding Commonwealth v. Badgett
Q1. Does Badgett mean every attorney who posts controversial opinions online has a conflict of interest?
No. The decision focuses on extreme and public bias directed at a class that includes the defendant, overlapping in time with representation. Mere political opinions or general commentary would not automatically create a conflict. The bias must be of a kind that undermines the attorney’s ability to represent the client with undivided loyalty.
Q2. Can a defendant validly waive a conflict like this?
Yes—but only if the waiver is knowing, voluntary, and intelligent. That means the lawyer must fully explain the nature of the conflict, the available alternatives, and the potential risks of proceeding. Simply signing a form or being told “it’s not a problem” is not enough.
Q3. Does the defendant have to show that the bias changed the result of the case?
Under Article 12 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights, no. Once an actual conflict is shown and the waiver is invalid, the conviction or plea must be set aside. The prejudice is presumed.
Q4. Does this rule apply only to Black defendants or to firearms cases?
No. The principle applies to any defendant whose attorney has demonstrated strong bias or animus toward a group that includes the defendant. While Badgett involved racial bias and gun charges, the same rule would apply to religious, gender, or ethnic prejudice in any criminal case.
Q5. What should defense attorneys take from this decision?
Attorneys should examine their own public statements, maintain awareness of how bias may affect representation, and ensure that any potential conflict is addressed transparently with the client. When in doubt, disclose and document. And where a client belongs to a group against whom counsel has expressed animus, withdrawal may be the only ethical course.
Commonwealth v. Badgett (Mass. App. Ct., Nov. 3, 2025) is more than a reversal of one man’s plea. It is a reaffirmation that justice in Massachusetts depends on counsel who are both competent and free from bias—because loyalty cannot coexist with prejudice.