Commonwealth v. Delratez (2025): What the Appeals Court Said About Withdrawing an Old Guilty Plea — And What It Means for You

Nov 4

Quick Summary

In Commonwealth v. David A. Delratez, No. 24-P-911 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 30, 2025), the Massachusetts Appeals Court affirmed the denial of a motion to withdraw a 2014 guilty plea to second-degree murder. The defendant argued, nine years later, that he pled guilty only because his lawyer misadvised him that earned “good time” credits would reduce his parole-eligibility date below 15 years. The trial judge—who also took the original plea—denied the motion after a hearing. On appeal, the panel (Hodgens, J., for the Court; D’Angelo, J., dissenting) held that the record showed a knowing and voluntary plea: the on-the-record colloquy correctly described a life sentence with parole eligibility at 15 years, and longstanding Massachusetts and federal cases make clear that not every incorrect prediction by counsel renders a plea involuntary.

For people wondering whether they can undo an old plea based on parole or good-time expectations, Delratez is important. It confirms that appellate courts will focus hard on what the judge, prosecutor, and defendant said in court at the plea hearing—and less on private predictions about parole or good time offered before the plea. That said, the dissent underscores why these issues can be close calls in some cases.

Background: The 2014 Plea and the 2023 Motion

The case: In 2014, the defendant pled guilty to second-degree murder (and other charges) in a global resolution. The agreed recommendation: life with an “initial parole eligibility date” of 15 years (the statutory floor for second-degree murder), with other concurrent sentences and some charges nol-prossed.
The record: During the plea, the judge and counsel discussed that the sentence was life with parole eligibility at 15. The judge indicated he wouldn’t exceed the joint recommendation without allowing withdrawal. The defendant acknowledged he heard the recommendation and was pleading guilty because he was guilty.
The later motion: In 2023, represented by new counsel, the defendant moved to withdraw the plea under Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b), asserting he was misadvised years earlier that good time would reduce the 15-year parole-eligibility date. He cited Commonwealth v. Najjar, arguing misadvice required plea withdrawal. The trial judge denied the motion without an evidentiary hearing (both sides agreed affidavits sufficed). The judge ruled that any misadvice concerned a collateral matter and the plea colloquy itself showed an intelligent and voluntary plea.

The Legal Landscape: Rule 30(b), Collateral vs. Direct Consequences, and Old Pleas

Rule 30(b) is the Massachusetts route for post-conviction relief—including motions to withdraw guilty pleas—when “it appears that justice may not have been done.” Courts apply the standard rigorously, especially post-sentence, and defer to a judge who also presided over the original plea.

A recurring theme in plea-withdrawal law is the difference between:

Direct consequences (the court must ensure you understand these), and
Collateral consequences (typically outside the judge’s mandatory script).

Over decades, Massachusetts and federal cases have said that not every incorrect prediction by a lawyer—especially about parole timing or good time—makes a plea involuntary where the on-the-record colloquy correctly stated the charge and minimum term. Courts have upheld pleas despite misadvice on various topics when the judge’s colloquy was accurate and the bargain the defendant received matched what was explained in court. See, e.g., principles reflected in Najjar (remand due to possible misunderstanding about an eight-year mandatory minimum by a pro se defendant where the record repeatedly conveyed erroneous info), and the broader Rule 30(b) framework.

The Appeals Court’s Holding in Delratez

1) Misadvice ≠ Automatic Plea Withdrawal

The Court reiterated that inaccurate or incomplete advice from counsel does not automatically render a plea involuntary. What matters is the totality—especially the plea colloquy. If the judge and the record clearly conveyed the life sentence and 15-year parole-eligibility date, then a private, earlier prediction about shaving time with good time usually won’t, by itself, undo the plea years later.

2) The Colloquy Controlled

Here, the defendant and counsel proposed the life-with-15 recommendation, and the judge accepted it. The clerk stated credit for pretrial custody; the prosecutor described maximums and the mandatory life for murder; counsel told the judge he’d explained possible mandatory minimums; and the defendant acknowledged hearing the recommendation. The Court concluded the defendant received what he bargained for: life with parole eligibility at 15.

3) Distinguishing Najjar

The Court rejected the claim that Delratez “precisely parallels” Najjar. In Najjar, a pro se defendant received repeated, uncorrected misinformation by the prosecutor during the plea—and the judge failed to articulate the mandatory minimum, creating a serious question whether the defendant knew an eight-year floor applied. Delratez was different: represented by counsel, no parallel pattern of misstatements in open court, and a fulsome colloquy correctly describing life with parole eligibility at 15.

4) Collateral Consequences and Parole/Good Time

The Court emphasized that good time and parole—as executive-branch, discretionary matters—are typically treated as collateral, not direct, consequences. A plea may be intelligent even if earlier predictions about parole timing turn out wrong, so long as the judge’s advisements covered the legal floor the defendant must serve before eligibility.

The Dissent: A Different View of Second-Degree Murder and “Mandatory Minimums”

Judge D’Angelo dissented, arguing:

Second-degree murder effectively includes a mandatory minimum because the court sets a parole-eligibility term between 15–25 years, during which the prisoner is not eligible for reductions like earned good time (absent commutation).
The defendant was not told during the plea that he faced a mandatory minimum; meanwhile, plea counsel’s misadvice (that good time would reduce the 15-year eligibility date) undercut the plea’s intelligence.
Because the length of required incarceration is a direct consequence, due process required that the defendant be told the 15 years functioned as a mandatory floor.

The dissent read Najjar to require that a plea cannot stand when a defendant wasn’t made aware he faced a mandatory minimum and was affirmatively misadvised that time could be cut below the floor.

Why Delratez Matters (Even If You Didn’t Plead to Homicide)

The Record Is Everything
When you ask an appellate court to undo a plea, the judges start with the transcript, docket, and judge’s advisements. If the transcript shows the floor and the deal clearly—and you say on the record you understand—courts are reluctant to unravel that years later.
Misadvice Can Matter—but Not Always
If counsel promised something that contradicts the colloquy, it’s hard (not impossible) to win. Where the judge and prosecutor were wrong on the record (like in Najjar, where misinformation went uncorrected for a pro se defendant), you may have more traction. But where the judge got it right and you said you understood, misadvice often falls into the “collateral” bucket.
Second-Degree Murder’s 15-Year Floor Is Real
Even though lawyers sometimes talk about good time and program credits, the statutory floor in second-degree murder is 15 years to parole eligibility, set under the statute and not typically reducible by earned good time for a life sentence. Understanding that reality on the day of the plea is critical.
Timing and Prejudice
Rule 30(b) motions filed years later face steeper hurdles. Courts worry about faded memories, lost witnesses, and the finality of convictions, so the longer you wait, the more precise and documented your claim needs to be.
Practical Guidance for Defendants and Families

Get the transcript. Don’t rely on memory. Ask a lawyer to pull the full plea colloquy and sentencing.
Map what was said. Did the judge state the mandatory life and 15-year eligibility? Did the prosecutor or clerk read maximums/minimums? Did you acknowledge understanding?
Document the misadvice. If a lawyer told you something different before the plea, put it in a sworn affidavit with as much specificity (dates, context) as possible.
Understand “direct” vs. “collateral.” Judges must cover direct consequences (like mandatory floors and statutory eligibility), but predictions about parole board decisions or program credits often won’t undo a plea.
Act promptly. If you believe your plea was not knowing or voluntary, talk to criminal appellate counsel immediately. Delay can hurt.

Frequently Asked Questions (Defendant-Focused)

Q1: My lawyer told me I could get “good time” and be eligible for parole sooner. Can I withdraw my plea?
A: Maybe—but it depends. If the judge’s in-court explanation made clear your minimum eligibility (e.g., 15 years for second-degree murder) and you acknowledged that on the record, appellate courts often treat earlier off-record predictions as non-dispositive. Cases like Najjar help where the record itself was wrong or unclear, especially with pro se defendants. Every case is fact-specific; have an attorney audit your transcript.

Q2: What’s the difference between “parole eligibility at 15 years” and a “mandatory minimum”?
A: Functionally, a 15-year eligibility date in second-degree murder is a hard floor before you can even be considered by the Parole Board. Some judges and lawyers label it a “parole-eligibility term,” others call it a “mandatory minimum” for eligibility. The Appeals Court majority in Delratez focused on whether the colloquy made that 15-year floor clear; the dissent emphasized that the judge should explicitly say it’s a mandatory minimum so the defendant can’t believe good time will reduce it.

Q3: My lawyer’s advice was wrong. Isn’t that ineffective assistance?
A: Not necessarily for plea withdrawal. Courts distinguish between ineffective assistance standards and the separate question whether your plea was knowing and voluntary. Even if advice was imperfect, if the colloquy correctly explained the legal consequences and you confirmed understanding, the plea can still be valid. The remedy analysis can be different in distinct contexts.

Q4: What if the judge never said the words “mandatory minimum”?
A: The majority view in Delratez is that courts look at the entire colloquy—not magic words. If the record made clear that your earliest eligibility was 15 years, and you accepted that, the plea may still stand. The dissent would require more explicit mandatory minimum language for due process clarity. That’s why a transcript review by appellate counsel matters.

Q5: How do I start a Rule 30(b) motion?
A: Work with experienced criminal appellate lawyers (Massachusetts) to obtain the transcript, draft affidavits, assess timeliness, and evaluate prejudice to the Commonwealth. A Rule 30(b) motion should be targeted and evidence-driven—not speculative.

Takeaways for People Considering Post-Conviction Relief

You must win on the record. What the judge said—and what you said back—often determines whether you can later undo a plea.
Misadvice claims are uphill if the colloquy was correct, but they are not impossible.
Mandatory floors matter. Even if not labeled “mandatory minimum,” a 15-year eligibility for second-degree murder is a real, non-reducible floor before the Parole Board can even consider you (subject to limited exceptions like commutation).
Act sooner rather than later. Courts view finality as important. A clean, early record and a focused motion are your best bet.

Final Thoughts

Delratez emphasizes a pragmatic truth: courts rely on the plea hearing record to decide whether a plea was knowing and voluntary. If your transcript clearly sets out the floor and you acknowledged it, a later belief about good time or parole timing may not be enough. But where the record itself is confusing or misleading, or where mandatory floors were not made clear, there can still be a path forward—especially with a well-prepared, evidence-based Rule 30(b) motion crafted by experienced criminal appellate lawyers in Massachusetts.

Call to Action: Unsure About Your Old Guilty Plea? Get Answers Before You Give Up.

If you pled guilty years ago and are now wondering whether you really understood the deal—especially your earliest parole eligibility or whether you were told you could shave time with “good time”—you’re not alone. The Appeals Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Delratez shows that overturning a plea is possible in narrow circumstances, but it also makes clear that not every bad prediction or off-the-record comment will undo a plea when the on-the-record colloquy was accurate.

That’s exactly why a careful review matters.

At Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP in Brockton, we help clients and families across Massachusetts understand their options after a plea—whether the issue is misadvice, parole eligibility, “mandatory minimum” exposure, or the consequences the judge actually explained on the record. We will:

Pull and review your full plea transcript and docket to see exactly what was (and wasn’t) said in court.
Compare off-record advice to the on-record colloquy, looking for the kinds of problems that can support a Rule 30(b) motion to withdraw a plea.
Explain the difference between direct and collateral consequences (what the judge had to tell you versus what your lawyer may have predicted).
Assess mandatory minimum issues and whether your understanding of parole eligibility was accurate under Massachusetts law for your specific offense.
Give you a straight, practical roadmap—including timelines, evidence we’ll need, and your best and worst-case scenarios.

Whether your case involves homicide, violent offenses, drug charges, OUI, or other serious felonies, don’t guess about your rights. Get a targeted review and a plan.

Call (508) 897-0001 or contact us online to schedule a confidential consultation today.

Your signature, your future. If your plea wasn’t truly understood, let’s find out—before you lose more time you can’t get back.

Joshua Wood