Street Racing and Reckless Conduct: Lessons from Commonwealth v. Faris (2025)
Overview
In an unpublished Rule 23.0 memorandum and order, the Massachusetts Appeals Court addressed the line between recklessness and negligence in a tragic street-racing case. In Commonwealth v. Mfouad Faris (24-P-1275, Oct. 15, 2025), the panel upheld an involuntary manslaughter conviction but vacated a duplicative motor-vehicle-homicide conviction, agreeing with both parties that the latter merged with the former under established case law.
Although Faris cannot be cited as binding precedent, it underscores an important principle in Massachusetts criminal law: when reckless driving results in death, the Commonwealth may prosecute under either involuntary manslaughter or motor-vehicle homicide—but not both.
The Facts
The case arose from a fatal late-night street race in Worcester on October 9, 2021. According to testimony, the defendant, Mr. Faris, had been drinking with friends, including the victim, and was boasting about his newly modified Mitsubishi Lancer—a car inspired by the Fast & Furious films.
A friendly challenge quickly escalated into a race. Faris and another driver lined up at a stoplight, revved their engines, and accelerated down Summer Street at roughly 60 miles per hour—twice the posted limit. Faris drove into the oncoming lane, attempting to overtake the other car. When he tried to re-enter his lane, he lost control, colliding with an oncoming vehicle and crashing through a fence into the Worcester Police Department parking lot.
The victim, who was seated in the back seat, was ejected from the vehicle and died from blunt-force injuries to the head and torso.
The Issues on Appeal
Mr. Faris challenged his convictions for:
Involuntary Manslaughter (G.L. c. 265, § 13), and
Motor Vehicle Homicide by Reckless Operation (G.L. c. 90, § 24G [c]).
He argued that the Commonwealth’s evidence failed to establish reckless conduct sufficient for manslaughter, and that convicting him of both offenses violated double-jeopardy principles.
The Appeals Court’s Ruling
The panel (Justices Shin, Grant, and Hershfang) affirmed the manslaughter conviction but reversed the motor-vehicle-homicide conviction as duplicative.
1. Reckless Conduct Was Proven
Applying the familiar Latimore standard, the Court found ample evidence that Faris’s conduct was both wanton and reckless. Racing on public streets at twice the speed limit, weaving into oncoming traffic, and losing control in a well-lit area with other cars present created a “high degree of likelihood that substantial harm will result to another person.”
Citing Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass. 770 (2025), and Commonwealth v. DeSimone, 349 Mass. 770 (1965), the panel concluded that a jury could reasonably find the defendant’s behavior met the threshold for involuntary manslaughter, even if he did not intend to cause harm81-144-25.
2. Duplicative Convictions Vacated
The Commonwealth conceded—and the Court agreed—that the motor-vehicle-homicide conviction duplicated the manslaughter conviction. Under Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387 (1981), and reaffirmed in Njuguna, “If involuntary manslaughter by reckless driving in public is proved, homicide by negligently or recklessly operating to endanger is proved as well.”
Because the same conduct underlay both charges, the Court vacated and dismissed the motor-vehicle-homicide indictment and affirmed the manslaughter judgment.
Why the Case Matters
While Faris is an unpublished summary decision and thus not binding precedent, it illustrates several practical points relevant to Massachusetts criminal defense:
Street racing is per se dangerous conduct. Even absent alcohol or intent, excessive speed and lane-weaving can support a finding of wanton or reckless disregard for human life.
Duplicative convictions are not permitted. When one offense (such as manslaughter) necessarily includes another (motor-vehicle homicide), the lesser conviction must be vacated.
Appellate advocacy matters. The Commonwealth’s concession and the panel’s independent review show that appellate courts will act to correct duplicative verdicts even when the underlying conduct is egregious.
Understanding the Limits of Unpublished Decisions
As with all Rule 23.0 (formerly Rule 1:28) decisions, Faris is not circulated to the full Appeals Court and reflects only the views of the three-judge panel. Such decisions may be cited for their persuasive value, but they carry no precedential authority.
See Chace v. Curran, 71 Mass. App. Ct. 258, 260 n.4 (2008).
This limitation means Faris cannot be relied on as binding law, but defense attorneys may reference it as persuasive support for merger or duplicative-conviction arguments in similar vehicular-homicide cases.
The Takeaway for Massachusetts Drivers and Defendants
Even a momentary lapse in judgment behind the wheel can trigger devastating criminal consequences. Prosecutors in Massachusetts routinely charge both manslaughter and motor-vehicle homicide in fatal crash cases—but as Faris shows, only one conviction may stand when the same reckless conduct causes the death.
For defendants, understanding this distinction can be critical at both the trial and sentencing stages.
FAQ: Commonwealth v. Faris (2025)
Q1: What did the defendant do?
He participated in a high-speed street race in Worcester that resulted in the death of a passenger in his car.
Q2: What was the outcome on appeal?
The Appeals Court affirmed the involuntary manslaughter conviction but vacated the motor-vehicle-homicide conviction as duplicative.
Q3: Why was the homicide charge duplicative?
Because the same reckless driving that proved manslaughter also satisfied every element of motor-vehicle homicide.
Q4: Can Faris be cited as precedent?
No. It is an unpublished decision under Rule 23.0 and may be cited only for persuasive purposes.
Q5: What cases controlled the result?
Commonwealth v. Njuguna, 495 Mass. 770 (2025); Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387 (1981); and Commonwealth v. Poirier, 458 Mass. 1014 (2010).
Legal Notice
This summary discusses Commonwealth v. Mfouad Faris, 24-P-1275 (Mass. App. Ct. Oct. 15, 2025), an unpublished memorandum and order issued under M.A.C. Rule 23.0. Such decisions are not binding precedent and may be cited only for persuasive value.