Judge Denies New Trial in Commonwealth v. Lisa Pina: What Massachusetts Defense Attorneys Should Know About Vehicular Homicide, Blind Spot Defenses, and Post-Conviction Relief
n Commonwealth v. Lisa Pina, Suffolk Superior Court No. 2019-483, Justice Paul D. Wilson denied a motion for new trial and a motion for a required finding of not guilty stemming from a fatal 2009 incident in which Lisa Pina ran over and killed a highly intoxicated pedestrian outside her apartment.
The court’s 2025 ruling revisits themes all too familiar to Massachusetts criminal defense attorneys: the boundaries of negligence in vehicular homicide cases, how and when blind spot defenses may succeed, and the high bar defendants must meet when seeking post-conviction relief based on ineffective assistance of counsel.
This blog post explores the court’s reasoning and offers key takeaways for lawyers defending clients against charges under G.L. c. 90, § 24G(b) (negligent motor vehicle homicide) and § 24(2)(a½)(2) (leaving the scene of an accident after causing death).
The Incident: A Fatal Mistake or Criminal Negligence?
On May 16, 2009, Lisa Pina pulled away from the curb in front of her Boston apartment and immediately ran over Brenda Keller, who had collapsed in the street after staggering drunk along the sidewalk. Pina reportedly stopped the vehicle, briefly examined Keller, misled a bystander into believing she had called 911, and then drove directly to a nearby car wash to clean her car.
The Commonwealth charged Pina with three offenses:
Motor vehicle homicide by negligent operation under G.L. c. 90, § 24G(b);
Leaving the scene of an accident after causing personal injury and death under G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a½)(2); and
Tampering with evidence under G.L. c. 268, § 13E.
Following a 2023 bench trial (after waiving her right to a jury), the trial judge found Pina guilty on all three counts. She was sentenced to one year in the House of Correction on each count, all to run concurrently. Sentences were stayed pending appeal.
The Post-Conviction Motions: A New Trial and a Required Finding
In 2025, represented by new counsel, Pina filed two post-trial motions:
A motion for a new trial on the motor vehicle homicide conviction, arguing ineffective assistance of trial counsel for failing to present expert testimony about the car’s blind spots; and
A motion for a required finding of not guilty on the charge of leaving the scene of a fatal accident, arguing that the statute requires proof she knew the victim had died.
Justice Wilson denied both motions.
Ineffective Assistance Claim: Blind Spot Defense and Missed Expert
Legal Standard: The Saferian Two-Prong Test
The court applied the well-known standard from Commonwealth v. Saferian, 366 Mass. 89 (1974), which requires the defendant to show:
That counsel's performance fell measurably below what might be expected from an ordinary fallible lawyer; and
That this error likely deprived the defendant of an otherwise available, substantial ground of defense.
Justice Wilson agreed Pina satisfied the first prong—but not the second.
What Went Wrong?
The defense at trial rested entirely on misidentification. Trial counsel argued that the prosecution had not proved beyond a reasonable doubt that Pina was the person driving the car. The Commonwealth’s identification evidence was largely circumstantial: surveillance video, documents in the car, and proximity to her home.
Pina now argued that trial counsel should have added a second defense—that if she was the driver, she could not have seen Keller lying in the road because of a blind spot.
The judge found:
Trial counsel did not strategically exclude the blind spot defense—he simply failed to realize that predecessor counsel had already secured funds to hire an accident reconstruction expert;
Failing to discover those funds and consult an expert did fall below the standard of a reasonably competent attorney.
However, the motion still failed because, even with that blind spot evidence, Pina’s conduct remained negligent.
Why the Blind Spot Defense Didn't Work
The court noted that even without a defense expert, the trial already included evidence that the A-pillar and car hood created significant blind spots. The judge, sitting as factfinder, explicitly considered that possibility at trial.
More importantly, Pina had been sitting in her parked car for seven minutes while Keller stumbled visibly down the sidewalk and into the street. Surveillance footage showed that Keller’s movements were in plain sight, not obscured by blind spots. Pina had ample opportunity to see Keller approaching her path of travel—even if Keller was not visible at the precise moment she pulled away.
In short, Justice Wilson concluded that even if Pina’s view was partially obstructed at the moment of impact, she was still negligent for failing to notice Keller in the minutes beforehand.
As the judge put it:
"One thing that the occupant of the driver seat was not doing during those seven minutes was paying any attention to what was happening outside her car."
No Evidentiary Hearing Required
Mass. R. Crim. P. 30(b) allows a judge to decide post-conviction motions without a hearing if the affidavits and record fail to raise a substantial issue. The court reviewed Pina’s newly submitted accident reconstruction report, concluded it wouldn't materially change the outcome, and denied the request for an evidentiary hearing.
Leaving the Scene of a Fatal Accident: Must the Defendant Know Death Occurred?
The second post-conviction motion challenged the trial court’s legal interpretation of G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a½)(2), which makes it a felony to leave the scene of an accident after causing personal injury and death.
Pina’s Argument: Knowledge of Death Required
Pina argued that the statute requires the Commonwealth to prove not just that she knew she hit someone and caused injury, but also that she knew the person had died when she left the scene.
The Court's Rejection: Knowledge of Death Not Required
Justice Wilson disagreed, citing Commonwealth v. Daley, 463 Mass. 620 (2012), and Commonwealth v. Muir, 84 Mass. App. Ct. 635 (2013), both of which held that the statute requires knowledge of injury, not death.
From Muir:
"[T]he Commonwealth is not required to prove that the defendant knew or expected death would result."
Even if Muir’s discussion was dicta, Justice Wilson found the reasoning compelling and consistent with grammar, logic, and legislative intent.
The court ruled that knowledge of death is not an element of the offense—and therefore the motion for required finding of not guilty was denied.
Defense Strategy Takeaways
1. Blind Spot Defenses Must Be Holistic
Blind spot arguments won’t absolve liability if the driver had prior opportunities to perceive danger. Surveillance evidence showing the victim’s visible, erratic movement undermined Pina’s claim that she was unaware of Keller's presence.
2. Preserve and Investigate Early
The court faulted trial counsel for missing evidence that prior counsel had secured expert funds. Defense teams must thoroughly review predecessor records to avoid forfeiting valuable trial tools.
3. Effective Assistance Requires Strategic Awareness
Had trial counsel strategically rejected a blind spot defense, the decision might have been protected. But failure to explore the defense at all—despite funds being available—was ruled constitutionally deficient.
4. Know the Statutory Elements
Leaving the scene cases under G.L. c. 90, § 24(2)(a½)(2) do not require proof that the driver knew the victim died. Defendants who panic or flee before realizing the seriousness of an accident can still face felony charges.
Final Thoughts: Lessons From Commonwealth v. Pina
This case reflects how complex and high-stakes post-conviction litigation can be. Lisa Pina had an arguably viable defense theory—but failure to properly develop and present it at trial wasn’t enough to overcome the Commonwealth’s strong circumstantial case and the judge’s assessment of the evidence.
The court’s analysis shows respect for the burden of post-trial motions and adherence to the principle that “justice may not have been done” must be more than a theoretical concern—it must be supported by a concrete, material possibility that the trial result would have changed.
Conclusion
In Commonwealth v. Lisa Pina, the Superior Court demonstrated that not every post-conviction error results in a new trial. Even when defense counsel falls short, the defendant must show a meaningful chance that the outcome would have been different. And in cases involving fatalities, fleeing the scene, and complex fact patterns, Massachusetts courts will rigorously apply statutory language and evidentiary standards.
If you or a loved one are facing charges for motor vehicle homicide or leaving the scene of an accident in Massachusetts, contact a criminal defense attorney who knows how to challenge evidence, file suppression motions, and—when necessary—build a record for effective post-conviction relief.