Commonwealth v. Michael Diaz: Massachusetts Appeals Court Suppresses Evidence After 123-Day Delay in Obtaining Search Warrant for Seized Cell Phone
Introduction
In Commonwealth v. Michael Diaz, 23-P-1462 (Mass. App. Ct. Aug. 29, 2025), the Massachusetts Appeals Court handed down a significant ruling on digital privacy and the Fourth Amendment. The case involved deeply disturbing allegations of child sexual abuse and child pornography — but the Court’s decision was not about guilt or innocence. Instead, it turned on a fundamental principle: even when police lawfully seize a cell phone incident to arrest, they must still obtain a search warrant to access its contents without unreasonable delay.
The Commonwealth argued that the seriousness of the allegations justified the delay. The Appeals Court disagreed, holding that the 123-day gap between seizing the phone and applying for a warrant was constitutionally unreasonable. As a result, the court affirmed the trial judge’s decision to suppress all evidence obtained from the phone.
This decision is a critical reminder that constitutional protections apply regardless of the nature of the accusations — and that law enforcement must act diligently when intruding on private digital data. For anyone facing criminal charges in Massachusetts, this case underscores why having an experienced criminal defense attorney is essential to safeguarding your constitutional rights.
Background of the Case
Allegations and Arrest
In June 2019, a twelve-year-old girl (identified by pseudonym as Amanda) disclosed to her mother that her foster father, Michael Diaz, had been sexually abusing her. She also reported witnessing Diaz abuse her eleven-year-old foster sister, Betty. Both children participated in forensic interviews attended by Sergeant Detective Anthony D’Alba of the Chelsea Police Department’s sexual assault and child abuse unit.
The girls described repeated sexual assaults between 2017 and 2019, including vaginal and oral rape, indecent touching, and exposure to sexual images. Importantly, both alleged that Diaz used his cell phone to:
photograph and receive sexual images of them,
arrange secret meetings to assault them, and
display sexual images of himself and his wife.
On July 18, 2019, Sgt. D’Alba obtained an arrest warrant. When Diaz appeared for a prearranged meeting, he was arrested and found in possession of an iPhone 6S. The police lawfully seized the phone as part of the arrest and placed it into secure evidence storage.
The 123-Day Delay
Despite the phone’s central role in the alleged crimes, police did not immediately seek a warrant to search its contents. Sgt. D’Alba testified that he worked on the warrant application intermittently over the course of several months while juggling an average of 80 open sexual assault cases, participating in forensic interviews, preparing witnesses, and responding to emergencies like shootings and unattended deaths.
Ultimately, he did not submit the application until November 18, 2019 — 123 days after the seizure. A search of the phone then uncovered:
sexually explicit photographs of Amanda and Betty,
photos of Diaz and his wife engaged in oral sex, and
child pornography depicting an unidentified young child.
Based on this evidence, Diaz was indicted on charges including aggravated rape of a child, indecent assault and battery, possession of child pornography, and related offenses.
The Motion to Suppress
In October 2022, Diaz’s defense attorney filed a motion to suppress all evidence recovered from the phone, arguing that the delay in obtaining a search warrant violated:
the Fourth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, and
Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
At an evidentiary hearing, Sgt. D’Alba acknowledged that he placed the warrant effort on the “back burner.” The Superior Court judge issued a detailed memorandum and order in October 2023 granting the motion to suppress. The Commonwealth sought and received interlocutory review, bringing the case before the Massachusetts Appeals Court.
The Legal Issue: What Counts as an “Unreasonable” Delay?
The central question on appeal was straightforward yet crucial:
When police lawfully seize a cell phone during an arrest, how long can they wait before applying for a search warrant to examine its contents?
The Governing Test: Commonwealth v. White
The Appeals Court applied the framework established in Commonwealth v. White, 475 Mass. 583 (2016). In White, the Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) held that when police seize property without a warrant, they must obtain a warrant “within a reasonable time.” Courts evaluate reasonableness by balancing:
the nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s possessory and privacy interests, against
the importance of the government interests justifying the intrusion.
There is no bright-line rule — each case must be evaluated on its own facts. But the SJC emphasized that “once a warrantless seizure has been executed, the police must make it a priority to secure a search warrant.”
The Appeals Court’s Analysis
Lawful Seizure but Unreasonable Delay
The Appeals Court acknowledged that the initial seizure of Diaz’s phone was lawful. Police had probable cause to believe it contained evidence of child rape and child pornography. The seizure was valid as a search incident to arrest.
However, even with a valid seizure, police were still required to seek a search warrant without unreasonable delay. Applying White, the Appeals Court weighed the competing interests.
Factors Supporting the Commonwealth
Grave nature of the crimes: The government had a compelling interest in prosecuting child sexual abuse, which the court called “particularly strong.”
Strong probable cause: There was specific evidence the phone was used to commit the crimes.
Defendant did not request the phone’s return: His silence could suggest a diminished possessory interest.
The Commonwealth cited federal cases upholding delays of 42 days (United States v. Sykes), 90 days (United States v. Stabile), and 4 months (United States v. Blanchard). It argued the 123-day delay here was similar.
Factors Supporting the Defense
Significant privacy and possessory interests: The court emphasized that cell phones are “digital records of nearly every aspect of their owners’ lives” (Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 395 [2014]).
Active use at arrest: Diaz was using the phone to communicate with Sgt. D’Alba when arrested, showing it was part of his daily life.
Lack of diligence: Sgt. D’Alba admitted he placed the warrant on the “back burner.” The court noted that while his workload was heavy, it “does not account for four months of delay.”
No Massachusetts precedent upholding such a long delay: The court stressed that no state case has found anything close to a 123-day delay reasonable.
Distinguishing Commonwealth v. Arthur
The Commonwealth relied heavily on Commonwealth v. Arthur, 94 Mass. App. Ct. 161 (2018), where an 85-day delay was found reasonable. The Appeals Court rejected that comparison:
In Arthur, the phones had independent evidentiary value as physical objects, proving how the defendants coordinated a joint venture.
In Diaz, by contrast, the phone’s evidentiary value depended entirely on its contents, which could not be accessed without a warrant.
Thus, Arthur did not control the outcome.
The Court’s Holding
The Appeals Court affirmed the suppression order. Even though the crimes were extremely serious, the court held:
“There is no Massachusetts precedent for finding a delay of 123 days to be reasonable, even with a compelling governmental interest.”
The Commonwealth bore the burden to show the delay was reasonable. It failed to do so. The court concluded that the trial judge correctly ruled the evidence must be suppressed.
The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Singh issued a forceful dissent arguing that suppression was improper.
1. White Should Not Apply
Singh argued White addressed warrantless seizures based only on suspicion.
Here, the phone was lawfully seized incident to arrest as an instrumentality of the crimes.
Police could hold it as evidence until trial, so there was no unlawful possessory intrusion to weigh.
2. Delay Was Reasonable
Government interest in prosecuting child sex crimes was “of surpassing importance.”
Diaz had minimal possessory interest because he wasn’t entitled to the phone during prosecution and never asked for it back.
Sgt. D’Alba was reasonably prioritizing other urgent duties.
3. Suppression Was Too Extreme
Suppression requires a “substantial and prejudicial” violation of rights (Commonwealth v. Hernandez, 456 Mass. 528 [2010]).
The evidence was discovered through a valid warrant supported by preexisting probable cause, not by exploiting the delay.
Singh stressed that Massachusetts has not adopted a “good faith” exception, but courts still weigh deterrence versus the societal interest in convicting the guilty (Commonwealth v. Diaz, 496 Mass. 210 [2025]).
Why This Case Matters
Digital Privacy Rights Are Robust
Even in horrific cases, courts strictly enforce constitutional protections.
Police cannot hold a phone indefinitely without promptly seeking judicial approval to search it.
Defense Lawyers Must Scrutinize Delays
If there’s a long gap between seizure and search, a motion to suppress may be viable.
The burden is on the Commonwealth to justify the delay, not on the defense to show prejudice.
Heavy Caseloads Are Not an Excuse
Officer workload does not excuse unreasonable delay.
Courts expect police to prioritize warrant applications once they seize highly private items like cell phones.
No Bright-Line Rule — But 123 Days Is Too Long
The decision stops short of setting a strict time limit.
But it makes clear: Massachusetts courts have never upheld a delay anywhere near this long.
Practical Takeaways for Defendants and Defense Attorneys
File motions to suppress promptly.
If a phone or computer was seized, demand the dates of seizure and warrant application. Long delays can be grounds for suppression.Argue both possessory and privacy interests.
Even if the client didn’t ask for their phone back, emphasize its centrality to their personal life.Use White and Diaz together.
Cite White for the general balancing test and Diaz for the clear statement that 123 days is beyond the bounds of reasonableness.Watch for prosecutorial counterarguments.
The Commonwealth may cite federal cases allowing longer delays. Be prepared to distinguish them as nonbinding and inconsistent with Massachusetts precedent.Stress Massachusetts precedent controls.
Appeals Court explicitly noted it was “constrained” by White and Massachusetts law, despite persuasive federal authority to the contrary.
Call to Action
If you or a loved one are facing criminal charges in Massachusetts — especially cases involving allegations of sexual offenses, child pornography, or any crime where digital devices have been seized — it is essential to have a skilled and aggressive defense attorney on your side.
At Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP, our experienced Massachusetts criminal defense lawyers know how to challenge unconstitutional searches and seizures. We have successfully litigated complex motions to suppress evidence based on Fourth Amendment violations, and we will fight to ensure your rights are protected.
Contact us today for a confidential consultation with a Brockton criminal defense attorney or a Boston sex crimes defense lawyer. Your future deserves the strongest possible defense.
Conclusion
Commonwealth v. Diaz reinforces that constitutional rights do not evaporate even when the accusations are severe. The decision underscores the critical role of judicial oversight and defense advocacy in ensuring that police cannot sidestep the Fourth Amendment by indefinitely holding a person’s digital life hostage without judicial review.
Massachusetts courts have sent a clear message: if law enforcement wants to search a seized phone, they must act quickly. When they don’t, the evidence may be lost — and for the accused, their rights are preserved.