A Second Look at Justice: Commonwealth v. Jonas Francisque and the Limits of New Trial Relief in Massachusetts
In Commonwealth v. Jonas Francisque, 24-P-148 (Mass. App. Ct. Apr. 18, 2025), the Massachusetts Appeals Court tackled a complex postconviction challenge involving newly discovered DNA evidence, undisclosed police reports, and claims of ineffective assistance of counsel. The case serves as a powerful reminder of the high bar criminal defendants must clear when seeking a new trial—even when the original investigation and prosecution appear deeply flawed.
Background: A Chaotic Night and a Deadly Outcome
The events of May 7, 2004, unfolded in the parking lot behind Roman’s Bar in Brockton, Massachusetts. Following a fashion show at Massasoit Community College, a large crowd gathered at the bar for an after-party. The victim, Marckenzie St. Juste, was involved in a brief altercation inside the bar after dancing with a woman named Melissa Sterlin. Her boyfriend, Melizaire Dorisca, and others—including the defendant Jonas Francisque—allegedly participated in an attack that left the victim with a stab wound to his chin.
After being separated from the initial altercation, the victim exited the bar minutes later and walked directly into a second, more violent confrontation in the parking lot. Eyewitness Fernando Moise testified that the same group of men who had attacked the victim inside the bar assaulted him again, this time fatally. The fatal blow was a stab wound to the heart.
Moise’s testimony was central to the Commonwealth’s case. He identified Francisque as the man who delivered the fatal stab and described a subsequent flight from the scene, during which Francisque allegedly made incriminating remarks. Another witness, Johanna Raymond—mother of Francisque’s child—testified that the defendant fled to New York to dispose of bloody clothes and made cryptic statements suggesting guilt. A jury ultimately convicted Francisque of second-degree murder and witness intimidation in 2008.
Postconviction Proceedings: DNA, Police Reports, and a Third-Party Culprit
After losing his direct appeal, Francisque filed multiple postconviction motions. His efforts gained traction when postconviction DNA testing revealed that the victim’s blood was found on the pants of another man present at the melee—Harry Wegens Cagne. Francisque’s DNA, by contrast, was excluded from fingernail scrapings collected from the victim.
The DNA evidence was just the beginning. Through public records requests, Francisque unearthed police reports authored by Brockton officers on May 8, 2004, which had never been disclosed to the defense. These reports documented that five men fled the scene in a black Nissan Maxima, a detail that contradicted the prosecution’s timeline and implicated other possible suspects.
Most significantly, a letter from Raymond—also never disclosed to the defense—suggested that Melizaire, Josener Dorisca (Melizaire’s brother), and Eddison Cesar were conspiring to pin the blame on Francisque. The Raymond letter appeared to corroborate the defense’s longstanding theory that Melizaire, not Francisque, was the real killer.
Additionally, a bombshell dropped during the evidentiary hearing: State Police Major Leonard Coppenrath testified that a large Black man with an Afro holding a knife—observed by bar owner Louis Asack during the melee—matched Cagne’s appearance. Since the murder weapon was a knife with a three- to four-inch blade, and Cagne had the victim’s blood on his pants, this fact raised serious questions about whether Cagne, not Francisque, delivered the fatal blow.
The Legal Standard: A High Bar for New Trials
In Massachusetts, a defendant seeking a new trial must either demonstrate (1) newly discovered evidence that would have likely influenced the jury’s verdict, or (2) a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice due to constitutional violations—such as ineffective assistance of counsel or suppression of exculpatory evidence in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963).
Here, Francisque raised both types of claims, including:
A Brady violation based on the undisclosed police reports and the Raymond letter;
Ineffective assistance of counsel for failing to test the physical evidence and investigate Cagne more thoroughly;
A cumulative prejudice claim based on the “confluence of factors” doctrine set forth in Commonwealth v. Rosario, 477 Mass. 69 (2017).
Despite acknowledging that the Commonwealth withheld exculpatory evidence, the trial court—and later the Appeals Court—denied both of Francisque’s motions for a new trial. The court concluded that while the evidence could have been useful, it was not likely to have changed the jury’s verdict.
The Court’s Reasoning: Cumulative Weakness, Not Cumulative Prejudice
The Appeals Court agreed that the undisclosed police reports and the Raymond letter should have been turned over to the defense. Yet it held that the evidence lacked sufficient impact to support a new trial.
Regarding the police reports, the court noted that they merely documented the flight of other suspects in a different car and did not directly contradict the core evidence against Francisque. As for the Raymond letter, the court emphasized that its content was largely cumulative of Raymond’s own testimony, which defense counsel had already used to cast doubt on the prosecution’s theory.
The most compelling new evidence came from DNA testing and Coppenrath’s testimony that the man with the knife matched Cagne’s description. Still, the court reasoned that the presence of blood on Cagne’s pants—specifically the “rear lower leg”—was more consistent with kicking than stabbing. Moreover, the eyewitness Moise explicitly testified that it was Francisque who stabbed the victim, and that the defendant made statements admitting as much.
According to the court, defense counsel had made a tactical decision to focus on Melizaire Dorisca as the likely third-party culprit. Given the strength of that theory—Melizaire had a clear motive, was seen covered in blood, and was heard threatening the victim moments before the attack—the decision not to pursue a weaker theory involving Cagne did not constitute ineffective assistance.
The Court’s Bottom Line: The Verdict Stands
Ultimately, the Appeals Court found that Francisque failed to establish either ineffective assistance or a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. The new evidence, while exculpatory, did not significantly undermine the Commonwealth’s case. The eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and post-incident behavior all pointed toward Francisque as the killer.
The court emphasized that even in the presence of undisclosed evidence and newly discovered forensic results, justice does not automatically demand a new trial. The question is whether the new material would likely have tipped the balance in the eyes of the jury. In Francisque’s case, the court concluded that it would not.
Why This Case Matters
Commonwealth v. Francisque is a cautionary tale about the limits of postconviction relief, even when the defense uncovers troubling irregularities years after trial. The case underscores several key points for defense lawyers, prosecutors, and policymakers alike:
Brady Violations Are Not Automatic Wins: While the failure to disclose exculpatory material is a constitutional violation, it only supports a new trial if the defendant can demonstrate a substantial basis for prejudice.
Third-Party Culprit Theories Require More Than Suspicion: The courts demand strong corroboration and clear linkage to the crime. It is not enough to suggest that someone else had a motive or was in the area. There must be evidence they committed the crime.
Tactical Decisions Matter: Once a defense strategy has been clearly executed at trial, postconviction challenges that rely on alternate, unexplored theories may face skepticism—especially if the initial strategy was well-grounded.
Newly Discovered Evidence Faces a High Hurdle: Courts are reluctant to disturb jury verdicts unless the new evidence would likely have changed the outcome. Even DNA evidence must be compelling, not merely suggestive.
The “Confluence of Factors” Standard Is Narrow: While Rosario opened the door to holistic review of combined errors, courts remain conservative in applying it. Multiple weak or marginally helpful facts do not automatically add up to reversible error.
Final Thoughts: Justice Seen Through a Narrow Lens
It is easy to sympathize with Jonas Francisque’s postconviction claims. Key evidence was never disclosed. Witness testimony evolved under police pressure. Another man was seen holding a knife and had the victim’s blood on his clothes. To many observers, these facts would raise a reasonable doubt.
Yet the courts viewed the new evidence through the strict lens of legal prejudice—not moral uncertainty. The prosecution’s core theory remained intact, and the jury had already heard substantial evidence of Francisque’s guilt. In this light, the Appeals Court’s refusal to grant a new trial was consistent with Massachusetts precedent, even if it leaves lingering doubts in the court of public opinion.
Francisque’s case may yet live on in future postconviction litigation—particularly through an ineffective assistance of counsel claim or a motion based on further forensic analysis. But for now, Commonwealth v. Jonas Francisque reaffirms a sobering truth about the Massachusetts justice system: exculpatory evidence, on its own, is not enough. It must also be compelling enough to convince the courts that justice was not merely imperfect, but fundamentally compromised.