When Animal Cruelty Is (and Is Not) a Crime in Massachusetts: Lessons from Commonwealth v. Amanda L. Bonia
Animal cruelty cases are emotionally charged. They often begin with disturbing facts, strong public reactions, and an assumption that any harm to an animal must necessarily be criminal. But Massachusetts law draws careful distinctions—between neglect and misjudgment, between poor outcomes and criminal intent, and between different theories of liability under the same statute.
The Massachusetts Appeals Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Amanda L. Bonia is a clear example of those distinctions at work.
In Bonia, the court affirmed an animal cruelty conviction—but only after closely parsing the statute, rejecting one of the Commonwealth’s theories outright, and clarifying exactly what the prosecution must prove in future cases. For defense attorneys, the opinion is significant not because the conviction stood, but because of what the court limited, clarified, and refused to expand.
This case matters for anyone facing allegations under Massachusetts’s animal cruelty statute, G. L. c. 272, § 77.
The Case in Brief
Amanda Bonia was convicted after a jury trial of animal cruelty based on allegations that she failed to provide her dog with proper food, water, shelter, and protection from the weather. The dog was found severely emaciated and dehydrated and was later euthanized.
On appeal, Bonia raised three principal arguments:
The jury was unfairly prejudiced by improper testimony that was later struck.
The trial judge failed to properly instruct the jury on intent.
The evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
The Appeals Court rejected the first two arguments—but partially agreed with the third, concluding that the Commonwealth failed to prove one of its charged theories.
That distinction is the heart of the case.
Not All Animal Cruelty Charges Require the Same Mental State
Massachusetts’s animal cruelty statute is broader—and more complex—than many people realize. Section 77 contains multiple clauses, each addressing different kinds of conduct and requiring different levels of intent.
One clause prohibits “knowingly and willfully” subjecting an animal to unnecessary torture, suffering, or cruelty. That language requires proof that the defendant intended the animal to suffer.
Another clause—at issue in Bonia—covers a different category entirely. It applies to someone who, having custody of an animal, unnecessarily fails to provide proper food, drink, shelter, sanitation, or protection from the weather.
The Appeals Court emphasized that this second clause does not require proof that the defendant intended the animal to suffer. Instead, it requires proof that the defendant:
Had charge or custody of the animal,
Intentionally failed to provide a listed necessity,
Did so unnecessarily, and
Failed to provide what was proper to keep the animal in reasonably good health.
That is a critical distinction. The law targets intentional conduct, not accidental lapses—but it does not require proof of malice or cruelty in the ordinary sense of the word.
Intent Still Matters—Just Not the Way the Defendant Argued
Bonia argued that the jury should have been instructed that the Commonwealth had to prove she intended her dog to suffer. The Appeals Court rejected that argument.
But the court did not say intent is irrelevant.
Instead, it reaffirmed that the Commonwealth must prove the defendant intentionally engaged in the conduct that violated the statute—meaning the failure to provide food or water was voluntary and deliberate, not accidental or unavoidable.
This matters because animal cruelty cases often arise from poverty, isolation, aging animals, medical decline, or personal crisis. The law does not criminalize every bad outcome. It criminalizes intentional omissions that are unnecessary and improper under the circumstances.
The Commonwealth Overreached on Shelter—and Lost
One of the most important parts of the decision is what the Appeals Court rejected.
The Commonwealth charged Bonia with failing to provide proper shelter and protection from the weather. But the evidence showed that after animal control raised concerns, Bonia obtained a dog shelter. There was no evidence that the dog could not access it, that it was structurally inadequate, or that Bonia intentionally prevented its use.
The court held that this was not enough to sustain a conviction on a shelter theory.
In doing so, the Appeals Court made several important points:
The statute does not impose “unbounded criminal liability.”
“Unnecessarily” and “proper” must be given their ordinary meanings.
A defendant who responds reasonably to concerns—even if imperfectly—does not automatically become criminally liable.
Where the Commonwealth relies on technical or medical inferences, expert testimony may be required.
This portion of the decision is a quiet but powerful check on prosecutorial overreach.
Why the Conviction Still Stood
Although the shelter theory failed, the conviction was affirmed because the statute is written in the disjunctive. The Commonwealth only needed to prove one qualifying failure.
Here, the court concluded there was sufficient evidence that Bonia unnecessarily failed to provide proper food and water, based on testimony that the dog was regularly outside without visible food or water and medical evidence of severe dehydration and emaciation.
Importantly, the court emphasized that:
The Commonwealth did not need to prove that the deprivation caused harm.
The jury could infer intent from repeated conduct over time.
The jury was entitled to reject the defendant’s explanation, even if it suggested care or concern.
This underscores a difficult reality in animal cruelty cases: good intentions do not always negate criminal liability, particularly where prolonged deprivation is alleged.
Struck Testimony and Curative Instructions
Bonia also argued that she was unfairly prejudiced by two improper witness statements that were struck from the record. The Appeals Court rejected this claim, reiterating a long-standing principle: juries are presumed to follow clear instructions to disregard inadmissible evidence.
Absent extraordinary circumstances, struck testimony—combined with prompt and direct curative instructions—will not require reversal.
Why This Case Matters for Defendants
Commonwealth v. Bonia is not a blanket endorsement of aggressive animal cruelty prosecutions. Quite the opposite.
The decision:
Confirms that not every failure is criminal.
Requires courts to scrutinize what is “unnecessary” and “proper” in context.
Limits the Commonwealth’s ability to rely on speculation or hindsight.
Reinforces that intentional conduct must still be proven, even where suffering is evident.
For defense attorneys, the case provides a framework for challenging overbroad theories, demanding precision in jury instructions, and forcing the Commonwealth to prove each element—carefully and honestly.
Final Takeaway
Animal cruelty cases are among the most emotionally difficult in the criminal justice system. But emotion cannot substitute for proof.
Commonwealth v. Bonia reminds us that Massachusetts law still requires careful statutory interpretation, meaningful intent analysis, and evidence—not assumptions.
That is not leniency. It is the rule of law.
Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ)
Does Massachusetts animal cruelty law require intent to harm an animal?
Not always. Some provisions require proof of knowing and willful cruelty. Others, including failures to provide food or water, require proof of intentional conduct—but not intent to cause suffering.
Can someone be convicted even if they cared about their animal?
Yes. Good intentions do not automatically defeat criminal liability if the Commonwealth proves an unnecessary and intentional failure to provide proper care.
Does providing some shelter automatically defeat a cruelty charge?
No—but Bonia makes clear that reasonable corrective action can defeat a shelter-based theory if the Commonwealth cannot prove intentional deprivation.
Does the Commonwealth have to prove actual harm to the animal?
No. The statute focuses on failure to provide necessities, not on proving resulting injury—though medical evidence often plays a key role.
Why is this case important for defense attorneys?
Because it limits overreach, clarifies intent requirements, and reinforces that animal cruelty cases must be proven—not presumed.
Conclusion:
Animal cruelty allegations carry serious consequences—criminal penalties, public stigma, and long-term collateral effects. These cases are fact-intensive, statute-driven, and often misunderstood by both the public and the courts.
If you or someone you care about is facing animal cruelty charges in Massachusetts, it is critical to speak with a defense attorney who understands how these statutes actually work, not just how they sound. The difference between a lawful conviction and an unlawful one often turns on details like intent, custody, necessity, and proof—details that matter long before a jury ever hears the case.
An informed defense can make all the difference. Call Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP at: (508) 897-0001.