Trial Judge Upholds Anticipatory Search Warrant in Commonwealth v. Manzueta
Introduction
In December 2022, the Middlesex Superior Court denied a defendant’s motions to suppress cocaine and other narcotics seized during a Lowell drug-trafficking investigation. In Commonwealth v. Rafael Manzueta (1981CR0335), Associate Justice David A. Deakin ruled that an anticipatory search warrant—a warrant that becomes valid only after a specified “triggering condition” occurs—was properly issued and lawfully executed.
Although this is a trial-level decision and not binding precedent, it offers an unusually detailed look at how Massachusetts judges evaluate probable cause, triggering events, and the permissible scope of a residential search in complex narcotics cases.
Background: A Lowell Cocaine Investigation
Beginning in 2018, State Police and local detectives investigated Joseph Alicea, a repeat offender suspected of running a cocaine-distribution network in Lowell. Wiretaps, pole-camera footage, and controlled buys revealed that Alicea continued to orchestrate sales even while serving a sentence for earlier fentanyl trafficking12-097-22.
By mid-2019, investigators intercepted calls between Alicea and Rafael Manzueta, a Lowell resident who drove a Mazda CX-9 registered to the same address later searched. The two men discussed Manzueta’s planned purchase of 100 grams of cocaine, then larger amounts—up to 300 grams—in subsequent conversations12-097-22.
On June 18, 2019, troopers sought and obtained an anticipatory warrant to search:
The residence at 64 Richardson Street, Apartment 17, Lowell;
The Mazda CX-9; and
Manzueta’s person.
The warrant would become effective once police observed the triggering event—Manzueta’s visit to Alicea’s home to pick up cocaine, followed by his return directly to 64 Richardson Street12-097-22.
That evening, surveillance confirmed the sequence. Officers watched Manzueta enter Alicea’s building, remain inside briefly, and drive directly back to Richardson Street. Within minutes, a wiretapped call captured him complaining that the cocaine weighed 222 grams instead of 250 and “smelled like outdoor stuff.”
Believing the condition satisfied, officers executed the warrant. They forced entry after hearing movement inside and found Manzueta attempting to flush pills down a toilet. A search of a backpack and his distinctive fluorescent windbreaker uncovered multiple drugs, digital scales, cash, and about 100 grams of cocaine.
The Motions to Suppress
Manzueta filed three related suppression motions:
To suppress all evidence seized from the apartment;
To suppress evidence seized from his person; and
To suppress any post-arrest statements as “fruits of the poisonous tree.”
He argued:
The warrant lacked probable cause linking the residence to drug trafficking;
The triggering condition never actually occurred; and
Police exceeded the scope of the warrant by searching his clothing.
Judge Deakin denied all three motions12-097-2212-097-22.
Legal Framework: Anticipatory Warrants in Massachusetts
An anticipatory search warrant is issued before the event giving rise to probable cause actually happens. Under Commonwealth v. Colondres, 471 Mass. 192 (2015), such a warrant is valid only if:
There is probable cause to believe that the triggering condition will occur; and
Once it occurs, there will be probable cause to believe evidence of crime will be found at the specified location.
Judge Deakin applied these principles, citing Commonwealth v. Perkins (2017), O’Day (2003), and Dorelas (2016) for the requirement that affidavits be read “in a commonsense and realistic fashion,” not “parsed and severed” by hypertechnical scrutiny12-097-22.
Probable Cause and the “Nexus” Requirement
The defense’s primary argument was that probable cause to believe someone sells drugs does not automatically justify searching their home. The judge agreed with that general principle—citing Pina (2009), Dillon (2011), and Perkins (2017)—but found that this case provided a much stronger factual link.
The affidavit described recorded phone calls arranging a cocaine purchase, video surveillance of Manzueta visiting Alicea, and an immediate return to his residence followed by a phone call complaining about the weight of the drugs. These facts, taken together, created a logical and temporal nexus between the drug transaction and the apartment12-097-22.
The judge wrote that the evidence “strongly suggests that Manzueta then brought the cocaine —as well as the cellular telephone used to arrange the purchase—home with him.” That inference, he concluded, provided sufficient probable cause to search the residence.
Addressing the Defense Hypotheses
Manzueta argued that he might have left the cocaine in his car, and thus the warrant lacked probable cause for a home search. The judge rejected this as inconsistent with Massachusetts precedent, quoting Commonwealth v. Escalera, 462 Mass. 636 (2012):
“A warrant application need not establish to a certainty that the items to be seized will be found in the specified location, nor exclude any and all possibility that the items might be found elsewhere.”12-097-22
Because drug dealers commonly take narcotics and phones into their homes rather than leave them in vehicles, the inference was reasonable.
The Triggering Condition: “Direct Return”
A second challenge concerned whether the triggering event actually occurred. Manzueta suggested that he might have made intermediate stops after leaving Alicea’s house, as he had four days earlier when seen interacting with another driver.
The court disagreed. Detective testimony and pole-camera footage showed that he drove “directly back to 64 Richardson Street” within minutes, and his follow-up call to Alicea about the cocaine’s weight made it “highly unlikely” he had stopped elsewhere.
Judge Deakin emphasized that the Commonwealth’s burden is probable cause, not certainty:
“The test for probable cause is probable cause, not certainty.” (Escalera, 462 Mass. at 646.)”
That standard was easily met.
Scope of the Search: The Windbreaker
The final issue was whether officers exceeded the warrant’s scope by searching the defendant’s fluorescent windbreaker. Inside its pocket they found roughly 100 grams of cocaine.
The judge held the search permissible. Citing Commonwealth v. Wills, 398 Mass. 768 (1986), and Commonwealth v. Hawkins, 361 Mass. 384 (1972), he reasoned that police may look inside any container capable of holding the object of the search—here, narcotics. Because 222 grams of cocaine could “reasonably be found in a windbreaker,” the search was within scope.
The Fruits-of-the-Poisonous-Tree Claim
Manzueta also sought to suppress evidence from his person and his post-Miranda statements, arguing they flowed from an unlawful search. Having upheld the validity of the warrant, the court found “the tree … was not poisonous,” and denied suppression on that ground as well.
Key Points from the Ruling
Although the opinion binds no other court, its reasoning illustrates how Massachusetts judges may analyze similar motions:
Detailed factual linkage matters. Probable cause to search a home requires specific evidence tying the place to the criminal conduct. Here, wiretaps and immediate post-purchase conduct created that nexus.
Anticipatory warrants are lawful when the affidavit clearly describes a triggering condition and that condition occurs substantially as predicted.
Probable cause is a probability, not a certainty. Courts will not invalidate a warrant simply because an alternative possibility exists.
Search scope follows object size. If drugs could fit in a container or garment, officers may search it.
Trial judges read affidavits “commonsensically.” Overly technical parsing seldom succeeds.
Broader Lessons for Defense Lawyers
For defense counsel, Manzueta underscores the difficulty of attacking a well-documented anticipatory warrant. When investigators corroborate wiretaps with surveillance, timing data, and follow-up calls, judges are likely to find a sufficient nexus.
Still, the opinion suggests strategic openings:
Precision in the triggering clause. Judge Deakin noted that the warrant’s language—“followed by Manzueta departing … and returning to 64 Richardson Street”—was “not drafted terribly precisely.” A less commonsense reader might have found it overbroad. Future defense challenges can exploit vague or conditional drafting.
Burden of proving the trigger. The court “assumed” the Commonwealth bore that burden, citing Colondres. Where evidence of direct travel is weaker, that assumption could support suppression.
Scope arguments remain viable. Though rejected here, contesting whether the item sought could “reasonably be found” in a container is fact-dependent and sometimes persuasive.
Implications for Defendants
For anyone accused of drug trafficking or conspiracy in Massachusetts, the decision highlights how anticipatory warrants can authorize searches before the drugs even arrive. Once police can show a controlled delivery, monitored phone call, or short-range surveillance establishing that a suspect brought contraband home, suppression becomes difficult.
However, defendants still have robust constitutional rights:
A warrant must clearly define its triggering condition;
Police must strictly—or at least equivalently—comply with that condition; and
Courts must find a genuine probable-cause nexus between the alleged crime and the place searched.
If any of these elements are missing, the search may violate Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights and the Fourth Amendment.
Takeaways for Law Enforcement
The ruling also carries a cautionary note for investigators. Judge Deakin praised the officers’ meticulous coordination but criticized the vague drafting of the triggering clause. He emphasized reading warrants “in a commonsense way,” implying that clarity at the application stage can prevent litigation later.
The Limits of Persuasive Value
Because Commonwealth v. Manzueta is a Superior Court decision, it is not binding on other courts. Under Massachusetts practice, only published appellate opinions—particularly those of the Supreme Judicial Court—constitute precedent.
Nevertheless, trial-level decisions often shape motion practice by showing how individual judges interpret established principles. Defense lawyers and prosecutors alike study such rulings to anticipate how similar arguments may fare. Manzueta joins a line of well-reasoned but non-precedential opinions that illuminate how trial judges approach anticipatory-warrant issues in the real world.
Key Takeaways
Judge Deakin denied suppression, upholding an anticipatory warrant executed after a monitored drug transaction.
He found a strong nexus between the alleged crime and the defendant’s residence.
He ruled the triggering condition occurred and the search scope remained proper.
The case is not binding precedent, but it provides persuasive insight into how Massachusetts trial courts assess probable cause and warrant execution.
Conclusion
The Superior Court’s reasoning in Commonwealth v. Manzueta illustrates the balance Massachusetts judges strive to maintain between effective drug enforcement and constitutional safeguards. The opinion reinforces that anticipatory warrants, when carefully structured and executed, withstand scrutiny—but also that vague drafting or speculative links to a residence can still invite challenge.
For defense counsel, the lesson is to read every affidavit with precision: test the nexus, question the timing, and measure the “triggering condition” against the evidence actually presented. Even when suppression is denied, each case refines the limits of lawful police conduct.
About Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP
Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP is a Brockton-based criminal-defense firm representing clients throughout Massachusetts in drug-trafficking, search-and-seizure, and motion-to-suppress litigation. Our attorneys have successfully handled cases involving anticipatory warrants, controlled deliveries, and wiretap investigations in both Superior and District Courts.
If you face a drug-trafficking charge or believe your home was searched unlawfully, contact our office for a confidential consultation. We can review the warrant, evaluate its triggering conditions, and defend your constitutional rights at every stage.