SJC Allows Postconviction DNA Testing in First-Degree Murder Case

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Cadet is an important reminder that postconviction DNA testing is not limited to cases where a defendant claims that someone else committed the crime. DNA testing may also matter where the defendant admits involvement but claims that the killing was legally justified — for example, because he acted in self-defense.

In Cadet, the defendant had been convicted of murder in the first degree for killing Betina Francois. At trial, he testified that the victim attacked him first with knives and that he stabbed her while defending himself. Years later, after his conviction had been affirmed, he filed a motion under G. L. c. 278A seeking postconviction forensic testing.

The requested testing focused on the handles of two knives and a bleach bottle found at the scene. The defendant argued that “handler” DNA testing could support his self-defense claim by showing who had handled the knives. He also argued that testing the bleach bottle could undermine the Commonwealth’s claim that he attempted to clean the scene because of consciousness of guilt.

The Superior Court denied the motion without a hearing, finding that the defendant had not made a sufficient preliminary showing that the requested testing could produce material evidence. The SJC reversed in part.

What Is Handler DNA Testing?

Handler DNA testing is a type of testing used to determine whether DNA can be recovered from areas where an item is typically touched or held. In a case involving a knife, for example, testing the handle may help show who handled the weapon.

That does not mean handler DNA testing will always produce useful results. The absence of DNA, the presence of mixed DNA, or the transfer of DNA can all create issues. But at the preliminary stage under G. L. c. 278A, the defendant does not need to prove what the testing will show. He only needs to show that the testing has the potential to produce evidence that could be material.

The Low Threshold Under G. L. c. 278A

The key part of the SJC’s decision is its discussion of the defendant’s burden at the initial stage of a motion for postconviction testing.

Chapter 278A creates a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the motion meets the preliminary requirements of the statute. If it does, the defendant is entitled to a hearing. At that later hearing, the defendant must prove the necessary facts by a preponderance of the evidence.

At the preliminary stage, however, the burden is low. The judge is not supposed to decide credibility, weigh the evidence from trial, or determine whether the requested testing will actually change the result. The defendant only has to identify specific information showing that the requested analysis has the potential to produce material evidence.

That distinction mattered in Cadet. The motion judge denied relief at the threshold stage, but the SJC held that the defendant had provided enough to get a hearing.

Why the Knife Handles Mattered

The defendant’s theory was that the victim attacked him first with two knives, and that he was able to take one of them from her before stabbing her in self-defense. Testing the knife handles could potentially support that account.

For example, if testing showed the victim’s handler DNA on both knives and the defendant’s handler DNA on only one knife, that result could support the claim that the victim brought both knives into the confrontation and that the defendant handled only the knife he took from her.

The Commonwealth argued that the testing might not prove much because the victim’s DNA could have been on the knives for other reasons. The SJC rejected that argument at this stage. Those arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not whether the defendant is entitled to a hearing.

That is an important point. A defendant seeking testing under c. 278A does not have to eliminate every innocent explanation for the expected results before the testing is even done. The question is whether the testing could produce evidence that matters.

Why the Bleach Bottle Mattered

The SJC also held that the defendant had made a sufficient showing with respect to the bleach bottle.

At trial, the Commonwealth used evidence of consciousness of guilt to argue that the defendant did not act lawfully in self-defense. One part of that evidence was the defendant’s own testimony that he tried to clean blood from the scene after the killing.

In his postconviction motion, however, the defendant claimed that this testimony was false and that trial counsel had urged him to say he tried to clean the scene because counsel believed there was no other explanation for the bleach bottle being there.

The SJC did not decide whether that claim was true. Instead, it held that testing the bleach bottle could potentially matter. If the defendant’s handler DNA was not on the bleach bottle, that result could support his claim that he did not use it to clean the scene. That, in turn, could weaken part of the Commonwealth’s consciousness-of-guilt evidence.

The Court was careful not to say that every piece of evidence undermining consciousness of guilt will always be material under c. 278A. But in the circumstances of this case, where the consciousness-of-guilt evidence was connected to the defendant’s self-defense claim, the defendant had cleared the low preliminary bar.

Self-Defense Can Be a Claim of Factual Innocence

One of the most important aspects of Cadet is the Court’s recognition that a self-defense claim can support postconviction testing.

The Commonwealth often treats postconviction DNA testing as though it only matters when the defendant says, “I was not there” or “someone else did it.” But the statute is broader than that. A defendant who claims that a homicide was justified by self-defense is claiming factual innocence of murder. In that situation, testing may be material if it could help show that no crime occurred.

That principle is especially important in homicide cases. The identity of the person who caused the death may not be disputed. The real issue may be what happened in the room, who was the first aggressor, whether the defendant reasonably feared for his life, or whether the Commonwealth can prove malice beyond a reasonable doubt.

DNA evidence can matter to those questions.

Practical Implications for Criminal Cases

For defendants seeking postconviction testing, Cadet reinforces that the preliminary burden under G. L. c. 278A is modest. A defendant does not have to prove the test results in advance. He does not have to prove that the results will lead to a new trial. He does not even have to prove that the results will ultimately change the verdict.

At the threshold stage, the question is whether the requested testing has the potential to produce evidence that is material to the defense theory.

That matters in cases involving self-defense, accident, lack of intent, or other defenses where the defendant may admit some involvement but deny criminal liability. Postconviction testing should not be rejected simply because the defendant was present, because the defendant testified, or because there was strong evidence against him at trial.

The decision also limits what a judge may do at the preliminary stage. The judge should not reject the motion by weighing the strength of the Commonwealth’s trial evidence, discrediting the defendant’s affidavit, or deciding that the requested testing probably will not help. Those may be issues for a later hearing, but they are not proper reasons to deny a motion at the initial screening stage.

For defense lawyers, Cadet is a useful case to cite when seeking testing of physical evidence that may support a trial theory, rebut consciousness-of-guilt evidence, or clarify the sequence of events. The opinion makes clear that materiality under c. 278A is not limited to third-party culprit cases.

Conclusion

Commonwealth v. Cadet does not decide whether the defendant will ultimately receive DNA testing. It decides that he was entitled to a hearing.

That distinction is important. The SJC did not rule that the DNA testing will prove self-defense. It did not rule that the conviction should be vacated. It ruled that the defendant made enough of a preliminary showing to move forward under G. L. c. 278A.

In postconviction litigation, that can be a significant step. Physical evidence may remain available years after trial. Scientific testing may be able to answer questions that were not answered at the original proceeding. And where the requested testing could support a claim that the defendant acted lawfully in self-defense, the court should not shut the door before the testing issue is fully heard.

The broader lesson is simple: postconviction forensic testing is not only about proving that the wrong person was convicted. It can also be about proving that the jury did not have all the evidence necessary to fairly decide whether a crime occurred at all.