Plymouth Superior Court Orders New Trial in Murder Case After Finding Brady Violation Over Undisclosed Neuropathology Report

A recent Plymouth Superior Court (Gordon, J.) decision in Commonwealth v. George T. Rhodes granted a motion for new trial in a first-degree murder case after finding that the Commonwealth failed to produce a forensic neuropathology report and related brain-section photographs that were material to the defense.

It is important to be clear at the outset: this is a Superior Court decision. It is not an appellate decision. It is not binding precedent. It does not control how another Superior Court judge, District Court judge, the Appeals Court, or the Supreme Judicial Court would decide a similar issue. But it is a substantial and carefully reasoned trial-court decision, and it may be useful as persuasive authority in cases involving Brady violations, Rule 14 discovery obligations, expert evidence, causation, and motions for new trial.

The decision is especially important because the court did not find that any prosecutor acted in bad faith. Instead, the court found that critical forensic evidence existed within the prosecution team’s possession, was not produced to the defense before trial, and could have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations. On that basis, the court ordered a new trial.

The Background of the Case

George Rhodes was convicted in 2021 of first-degree murder in the death of Sabrina McLean. The conviction rested on theories of extreme atrocity or cruelty and felony murder.

This was not Rhodes’s first trial. He had previously been convicted in 2016, but the Supreme Judicial Court later vacated that conviction because trial counsel had been ineffective in failing to request a voluntary manslaughter instruction based on reasonable provocation. After that reversal, Rhodes was retried in 2021 and again convicted of first-degree murder.

The Commonwealth’s theory was that Rhodes raped McLean, inflicted severe head injuries, and left her incapacitated in a garage bay in Brockton. After Rhodes left, a tow truck backed into the garage area and ran over the lower portion of McLean’s body. McLean was still alive when emergency personnel arrived but died while being transported to the hospital.

The causation issue became central. The Commonwealth argued that Rhodes caused McLean’s death in two independent ways.

First, the Commonwealth argued that Rhodes directly caused her death by inflicting fatal blunt-force head trauma.

Second, the Commonwealth argued that even if the tow truck caused the fatal injuries, Rhodes still caused McLean’s death by leaving her unconscious or incapacitated in a darkened garage area where it was foreseeable that a vehicle could run over her.

The defense argued that the head injuries were survivable and that the tow truck rollover was an independent, intervening cause of death.

Why the Neuropathology Report Mattered

The motion for new trial focused on a forensic neuropathology report and related internal brain-section photographs from McLean’s autopsy.

According to the court’s findings, the autopsy report referenced a neuropathology examination. But the defense team did not receive the separate neuropathology report or the brain-section photographs before the 2016 or 2021 trials.

That mattered because the Commonwealth’s medical examiner, Dr. Robert Welton, testified that McLean’s head injuries could have independently caused her death within minutes to hours if she did not receive medical attention. He also testified that he had reviewed the neuropathology findings and that they did not change his opinion about the victim’s head injuries.

The defense expert, Dr. Elizabeth Laposata, had reviewed the autopsy materials that were provided to the defense. Without the neuropathology report and internal brain photographs, her opinion was limited. At the first trial, she testified that the head injuries were not necessarily incompatible with life and could have been survivable with timely medical care. But she also had to concede that the head injuries could have caused death if left untreated.

Years later, after postconviction counsel obtained the complete OCME file, including the neuropathology report and internal brain photographs, Dr. Laposata changed her view in a significant way. She concluded that the head injuries did not cause or contribute to McLean’s death and would not have independently caused death absent the tow truck rollover.

According to the court, this changed the defense posture dramatically. The new materials would have allowed the defense to challenge the Commonwealth’s direct-causation theory much more forcefully.

The Discovery Problem

The Superior Court conducted a three-day evidentiary hearing to determine whether the report had been produced and, if not, whether the failure to produce it warranted a new trial.

The record was complicated. The court described the evidence regarding the movement of the report between the OCME, State Police, and the Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office as difficult to reconstruct. Memories had faded. The events stretched back more than a decade. The OCME’s record-management systems in 2014 were not what they later became.

Even so, the court found that the neuropathology report and related brain-section photographs were not turned over to the defense before February 2025. The judge described the evidence supporting that conclusion as “overwhelming.”

The court relied heavily on the credible testimony of both trial lawyers and the defense expert. The first trial attorney testified that he never received the neuropathology report and would have used it if he had. The second trial attorney testified similarly. Dr. Laposata testified that she never received the report before either trial, despite specifically needing the complete autopsy file to evaluate cause of death.

The court also found it significant that later searches of the Commonwealth’s own case files did not locate the neuropathology report. In 2024 and 2025, representatives of the Plymouth County District Attorney’s Office were themselves unable to find the report in the prosecution file. That fact strongly supported the defense position that the report had not been produced earlier.

The court did not attribute misconduct to any individual prosecutor. To the contrary, the judge accepted that the prosecutors believed they had produced the complete autopsy file. But the court found that they were operating under a mistaken understanding. The report and related photographs had not been provided.

Brady and Rule 14

The decision rests principally on Brady principles.

Under Brady v. Maryland, the prosecution violates due process when it suppresses evidence favorable to the accused that is material to guilt or punishment. In Massachusetts, a defendant seeking a new trial based on undisclosed exculpatory evidence generally must show that the evidence was in the possession, custody, or control of the prosecutor or someone subject to the prosecutor’s control, that the evidence was exculpatory, and that the defendant was prejudiced.

The court found all three elements satisfied.

First, the evidence was within the prosecution team’s possession because the OCME had the neuropathology report and related photographs.

Second, the report was exculpatory. It called into question a material element of the Commonwealth’s case: whether the head injuries inflicted by Rhodes directly caused McLean’s death. It also provided grounds to challenge the credibility and reliability of the Commonwealth’s medical examiner’s causation opinion.

Third, the nondisclosure prejudiced Rhodes. Because the defense had specifically requested the complete autopsy file, the court applied the standard for a specific request and asked whether there was a substantial basis for claiming prejudice. The judge concluded that there was.

The report could have helped defense counsel impeach the medical examiner and present a stronger expert opinion that the head injuries were not fatal. That evidence, in the court’s view, could have influenced the jury.

The Causation Issue

The causation issue is what made the report so important.

The Commonwealth had two theories: direct causation from head trauma and indirect causation from leaving McLean incapacitated in a place where she was later run over. The jury returned a general verdict. It did not specify which causation theory it accepted.

The Commonwealth argued that there was still sufficient evidence to support conviction under the indirect-causation theory. In other words, even if the head injuries did not directly cause death, the jury could still have found that Rhodes set in motion a foreseeable chain of events that led to McLean being run over.

The court rejected that argument as a reason to deny a new trial.

The question was not merely whether the evidence was legally sufficient under one theory. The question was what effect the withheld evidence might reasonably have had on the jury’s deliberations. If the neuropathology evidence had undercut the Commonwealth’s direct-causation theory, the jury would have had to confront the more complicated question of whether the tow truck rollover was reasonably foreseeable.

The judge identified several reasons why foreseeability was not simple. The garage area involved a key-card entrance. A vehicle entering might be expected to slow down. The tow truck’s backup alarm and backup lights were not functioning. The lighting conditions were poor. Another vehicle might have had a rear camera or might have inspected the area more carefully. Those facts could have allowed a jury to find reasonable doubt about whether the tow truck rollover was a foreseeable consequence of Rhodes’s conduct.

Because foreseeability is a jury question, the judge concluded that the court could not simply assume that the jury would have convicted on the indirect-causation theory if the direct-causation theory had been seriously undermined.

The Court’s Brady Ruling

The Superior Court concluded that the Commonwealth’s failure to disclose the neuropathology report violated Brady and required a new trial.

The court emphasized that the withheld report was not merely cumulative. Although the Commonwealth’s medical examiner testified that the neuropathology report did not change his conclusions, the issue was not whether the report was cumulative of his interpretation. The issue was whether the defense expert’s analysis of the report would have added something new and important.

It would have.

According to the court, Dr. Laposata’s interpretation of the report was dramatically different from Dr. Welton’s. Dr. Welton believed the head injuries could have killed McLean. Dr. Laposata, after reviewing the full neuropathology materials, concluded that they would not have killed her and that the tow truck rollover was the singular cause of death.

That difference was not cumulative. It went directly to an essential element of the Commonwealth’s case.

Ineffective Assistance of Counsel

The court also addressed ineffective assistance of counsel as an alternative ground.

The judge found that if trial counsel had possessed the neuropathology report and failed to use it, that failure would have been manifestly unreasonable. The report would have been the key evidence allowing the defense to challenge the Commonwealth’s direct-causation theory.

The court found that failing to use such evidence would have fallen measurably below the performance expected of an ordinary fallible lawyer and would have deprived Rhodes of a substantial ground of defense.

But the court’s primary conclusion was that trial counsel did not have the report. The ineffective assistance analysis functioned as an alternative: if the report had somehow been produced and not used, the result would still require a new trial because the failure to use it would have been constitutionally ineffective.

Why This Superior Court Decision Matters

Again, this is a Superior Court decision. It is not binding precedent. It should not be cited as controlling authority. It does not create a new statewide rule.

But it is an important persuasive example for several reasons.

First, it shows that Brady obligations extend beyond what an individual prosecutor personally remembers or physically possesses. Evidence within the prosecution team, including forensic materials held by the OCME, can trigger disclosure obligations.

Second, it demonstrates the importance of complete autopsy and forensic files in homicide cases. A summary autopsy report may not be enough. Underlying reports, photographs, testing, notes, and specialist analyses may contain information critical to causation.

Third, it shows how a withheld expert-related document can be material even where the Commonwealth argues that another theory of guilt remains viable.

Fourth, it reinforces that prejudice under Brady is not the same as proof that the defendant would definitely have been acquitted. The question is whether the withheld evidence could reasonably have influenced the jury’s deliberations.

Fifth, it underscores the danger of general verdicts where the Commonwealth presents multiple theories and later one theory is undermined by withheld evidence.

Defense Takeaways

For defense lawyers, the decision offers several practical lessons.

In homicide cases, counsel should make specific requests for the complete OCME file, including all specialist reports, neuropathology reports, toxicology materials, histology materials, photographs, x-rays, bench notes, diagrams, and any materials reviewed or relied upon by the medical examiner.

If an autopsy report references a pending consultation or a specialist review, counsel should follow up until it is clear whether a separate report exists.

Defense experts should be asked not only to review what has been produced, but also to identify what appears to be missing.

If a medical examiner testifies that he or she reviewed a report that the defense does not have, counsel should immediately request production and consider seeking a continuance, voir dire, sanctions, or other relief.

In postconviction cases, counsel should compare the defense file, prosecution file, and agency file. The fact that a document is missing from the defense file may not be enough standing alone, but when it is also missing from the prosecution file and later appears only in the agency’s records, that can become powerful evidence of nondisclosure.

Finally, counsel should remember that causation in a homicide case can be contested at multiple levels. Even if the defendant caused some injury, the Commonwealth must still prove legal causation beyond a reasonable doubt. Intervening events, foreseeability, medical causation, and competing expert interpretations may all matter.

A Caution About Authority

This decision should be used carefully.

It is not binding law. It does not mean that every late-disclosed forensic report requires a new trial. It does not mean that every missing autopsy subfile is automatically Brady material. It does not decide the ultimate medical truth of the competing expert opinions. And it does not bind any appellate court.

What it does provide is a detailed example of how a Superior Court judge applied Brady, Rule 14, and ineffective assistance principles to a record involving a missing forensic report that went directly to causation in a murder case.

The binding law remains the law announced by the United States Supreme Court, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, and the Massachusetts Appeals Court.

Conclusion

The Plymouth Superior Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Rhodes granted a new trial after finding that the Commonwealth failed to produce a forensic neuropathology report and related brain-section photographs that were material to the defense.

The court found that the report would have allowed the defense to challenge the Commonwealth’s direct-causation theory and to present expert testimony that McLean’s head injuries were not fatal. Because the jury could have considered that evidence in deciding whether the Commonwealth proved causation beyond a reasonable doubt, the court concluded that justice required a new trial.

The decision is not controlling authority. But as a persuasive trial-court ruling, it is a powerful reminder of the constitutional importance of full forensic disclosure, especially in a murder case where cause of death is disputed.

Questions and Answers About Commonwealth v. Rhodes

What kind of decision is Commonwealth v. Rhodes?

Commonwealth v. Rhodes is a Plymouth Superior Court decision on a motion for new trial. It is not an appellate decision and is not binding precedent.

Can lawyers cite Commonwealth v. Rhodes as controlling authority?

No. Superior Court decisions are not controlling authority. This decision may be useful as persuasive reasoning, but other judges are not required to follow it.

What did the court decide?

The court allowed George Rhodes’s motion for new trial after finding that the Commonwealth failed to produce a forensic neuropathology report and related brain-section photographs that were material to the defense.

What was the Brady issue?

The Brady issue was whether the Commonwealth failed to disclose exculpatory forensic evidence. The court found that the neuropathology report was within the prosecution team’s possession, was exculpatory, and prejudiced the defense because it could have helped challenge the Commonwealth’s causation theory.

Why was the neuropathology report important?

The report and related photographs allowed the defense expert to conclude that the victim’s head injuries were not fatal and would not have independently caused death. That contradicted the Commonwealth’s direct-causation theory.

Did the court find prosecutorial bad faith?

No. The court did not attribute bad faith to the prosecutors. The judge accepted that the prosecutors believed they had produced the complete autopsy file, but found that the neuropathology report and related photographs were not actually produced.

Why did the court order a new trial?

The court found that the withheld evidence could have been a real factor in the jury’s deliberations on causation. Because causation was central to the murder conviction, the court concluded that a new trial was required.