Massachusetts SJC Rules Sex Trafficking Statute Does Not Cover Buyers Responding to Independent Sex Worker Ads
On May 2, 2025, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) handed down a landmark decision in Commonwealth v. Brendan J. Garafalo (and nine companion cases), sharply defining the limits of the Commonwealth’s sex trafficking statute, G.L. c. 265, § 50. The Court ruled that individuals who simply respond to an online ad from an adult sex worker offering services for a fee—without force, coercion, or involvement in a broader trafficking scheme—are not guilty of sex trafficking under the statute.
While they may still be charged with the crime of engaging in sexual conduct for a fee under G.L. c. 272, § 53A, the ruling draws a clear line: Massachusetts’ human trafficking law is aimed at traffickers, not ordinary customers.
This decision has big implications for law enforcement, prosecutors, and defense attorneys alike.
The Background: A Police Sting Operation
In August 2021, Massachusetts State Police and local police conducted an undercover sting operation. They posted online ads that appeared to be from independent adult sex workers. The ads featured pictures, lists of services, prices, and contact info. They explicitly stated the woman depicted was “independent,” meaning not working under the control of a pimp or third party.
Five defendants—including Brendan Garafalo—responded to these ads, negotiated services and prices, and showed up at the appointed hotels at the appointed times. Unbeknownst to them, the “sex worker” they were texting was actually an undercover officer.
Upon arrival, each defendant was arrested. A Plymouth County grand jury indicted them on two charges:
Engaging in sexual conduct for a fee under G.L. c. 272, § 53A.
Trafficking of persons for sexual servitude under G.L. c. 265, § 50.
The defendants moved to dismiss the trafficking charges, arguing that simply responding to an ad from an independent adult could not possibly amount to trafficking. The Superior Court agreed, dismissing the indictments. The Commonwealth appealed.
The Legal Question: Does the Sex Trafficking Statute Cover Buyers?
Massachusetts’ sex trafficking statute is broad, imposing steep penalties—minimum five years in state prison—for anyone who:
“Knowingly … recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides or obtains by any means another person to engage in commercial sexual activity.”
The Commonwealth argued that the buyers in this case “obtained by any means” a person (the sex worker) for sexual servitude, and therefore fell squarely under the statute.
The defense—and ultimately the SJC—disagreed.
The SJC’s Analysis: Buyers Are Not Traffickers
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Wendlandt meticulously analyzed the statute’s language, legislative history, and purpose. Here’s how the Court broke it down:
1️⃣ Factual Impossibility Doesn’t Apply
The Commonwealth argued that even though the “sex worker” was an undercover cop, it was enough that the defendants believed they were engaging with a real person. The SJC agreed: factual impossibility is no defense to attempt crimes. So even though the victim didn’t exist, the charges weren’t invalid on that basis.
But that wasn’t the main issue.
2️⃣ Entice and Recruit: No Persuasion by the Buyer
The Court ruled that “enticing” or “recruiting” under the statute requires the defendant to actively persuade the person to engage in sex work. The statute punishes those who lure or coax someone into commercial sexual activity—not someone who passively responds to an offer.
Here, the buyers didn’t initiate anything. They didn’t pressure, persuade, or recruit. They simply responded to an ad that was already offering services. No enticing or recruiting occurred.
3️⃣ Obtain by Any Means: A Narrower Meaning
The Commonwealth’s central argument was that the buyers “obtained by any means” a person for sexual servitude.
The SJC acknowledged that “obtain” is a broad term. But, applying the canon of noscitur a sociis (a word is known by the company it keeps), the Court ruled that “obtain by any means” should be read in context with the surrounding terms: recruit, entice, harbor, transport, provide.
These verbs all describe stages of a trafficking operation:
Getting victims into the supply chain,
Moving and controlling them,
Passing them on to others.
In other words, the statute targets the business side of trafficking: pimps, transporters, brothel owners—not individual buyers dealing with a supposedly independent worker.
4️⃣ Legislative History Supports a Narrow Reading
The Court pointed out that when Massachusetts enacted its sex trafficking law in 2011, it mirrored the federal statute in many ways. But crucially, Congress amended the federal law in 2015 to explicitly add words like “solicit” and “patronize”—terms aimed squarely at punishing buyers. Massachusetts has not amended its law to add those terms.
Meanwhile, the Massachusetts Legislature did strengthen penalties for buyers under the separate “sex for a fee” law, increasing the maximum sentence for first-time offenders from one to 2.5 years in a house of correction. This suggests the Legislature saw a difference between buyers and traffickers and intended to keep them in separate legal categories.
5️⃣ Rule of Lenity Applies
Even if the language were ambiguous, the SJC emphasized that under the rule of lenity, any ambiguity in a criminal statute must be resolved in favor of the defendant. Because the statute didn’t clearly apply to buyers in these circumstances, the Court was bound to rule in their favor.
The Bottom Line
The SJC affirmed the dismissal of the trafficking charges. Buyers like Garafalo may still be prosecuted under the sex-for-a-fee statute, but they cannot be charged as sex traffickers when:
They respond to an ad from an ostensibly independent adult,
They accept terms set by the supposed sex worker,
And they do not coerce, recruit, or control anyone.
The Commonwealth’s attempt to stretch the trafficking statute to cover simple buyers was rejected.
Why This Case Matters
This ruling has major implications:
✅ Clarifies the scope of sex trafficking laws
Police and prosecutors now have a clear boundary: buyers are subject to prosecution under G.L. c. 272, § 53A—not under the harsher trafficking statute unless they are actively involved in the supply chain.
✅ Reinforces statutory interpretation limits
The Court signaled it will not allow vague or aggressive readings of criminal statutes. Ambiguities are resolved in favor of defendants, and expansions of criminal liability are the Legislature’s job, not the judiciary’s.
✅ Sets limits on undercover stings
While undercover operations targeting buyers are lawful, they cannot be used to manufacture trafficking charges where the law doesn’t reach.
✅ Aligns with national debates
This case aligns Massachusetts with several states and courts grappling with whether buyers should be treated as traffickers. Unless the Legislature amends the statute, Massachusetts buyers face prosecution as “johns”—not as traffickers.
Key Takeaways for Defense Attorneys
Always scrutinize sex trafficking indictments closely. Ask: Was the defendant actually involved in recruiting, harboring, transporting, or providing anyone?
Challenge attempts to use trafficking statutes against simple buyers.
Remember the rule of lenity: if a statute’s reach is ambiguous, the defense gets the benefit.
Conclusion
The Commonwealth v. Garafalo decision provides a sharp, well-reasoned interpretation of Massachusetts’ sex trafficking law, ensuring it targets those truly running trafficking operations—not ordinary buyers. The SJC’s ruling protects against prosecutorial overreach, maintains the Legislature’s careful balance between different statutes, and upholds the rule of law.
For defense attorneys, the message is clear: know the limits of the law, and hold the Commonwealth to them.