Massachusetts SJC Affirms Felony-Murder Conviction Based on Joint Venture Armed Robbery in Commonwealth v. Henderson

In Commonwealth v. Kaiden Henderson, SJC-13482 (Sept. 4, 2026), the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court affirmed convictions for first-degree felony-murder and armed robbery and explained what the Commonwealth must prove when a defendant is prosecuted as a joint venturer in an armed robbery that results in death. The SJC held that the jury could infer a planned robbery from circumstantial evidence, that Henderson could be liable even if the jury was uncertain whether he personally stabbed the victim, and that the trial judge was not required to give an unrequested larceny instruction that conflicted with the defense theory.

The Evidence at Trial

The killing arose out of a trip to the home of Jose Vasquez, a marijuana dealer known to Henderson and the other men involved.

Henderson, David Trongeau, and Devaughn Johnson drove to Vasquez's apartment. Johnson remained in the car while Henderson and Trongeau went inside. Shortly after Trongeau returned to Vasquez's bedroom from the bathroom, there was a crashing sound. Vasquez came out of the room bleeding heavily and later died from multiple sharp-force injuries to his neck, chest, ribs, and torso.

Henderson and Trongeau then ran from the apartment. Henderson was carrying two bags he had not possessed when he entered. Trongeau was holding a knife. Johnson opened the car doors as the men approached, Henderson got into the driver's seat, and they sped away.

Back at the hotel, both Henderson and Trongeau had blood on their clothing. Henderson changed his clothes—including his underwear—and discarded them in a hallway trash can. DNA testing later showed that blood on Henderson's jeans and underwear matched Vasquez.

There was substantial evidence that Trongeau had stabbed Vasquez. He later told his girlfriend that he had "blacked out" and stabbed Vasquez in the neck, and he separately admitted during a telephone conversation that he had stabbed Vasquez and that it had not been self-defense.

The question for Henderson, however, was not simply whether Trongeau was a killer. It was whether Henderson knowingly participated in the armed robbery and possessed the mental state necessary to support felony-murder.

The SJC Found Sufficient Evidence of a Planned Armed Robbery

The Court began with familiar Latimore principles: the evidence is considered in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, and the Commonwealth is entitled to reasonable and possible inferences even where those inferences are not necessary or inescapable.

The SJC concluded that the jury could infer that the robbery had been planned before Henderson and Trongeau entered the apartment.

The Court pointed to evidence that Henderson and Johnson were seeking marijuana to sell, that Vasquez had the type of high-grade marijuana they wanted, and that Henderson drove past Vasquez's building and parked around the corner even though parking was available directly in front. Henderson and Trongeau then entered the apartment while Johnson stayed in the waiting car with its lights on. Taken together, the SJC held that those circumstances permitted an inference of a planned robbery rather than an innocent drug purchase that unexpectedly went wrong.

What happened afterward reinforced that inference. Henderson ran from the apartment carrying two bags that were not his when he entered, one of which contained marijuana. Johnson immediately opened the vehicle doors, and Henderson drove the group away.

The significance of Henderson is not that any one of these facts proves an advance agreement. None does. The Court instead looked at the entire sequence and permitted the jury to infer the existence of a common criminal plan from the participants' coordinated conduct before, during, and after the offense.

That is often how joint venture cases are tried in Massachusetts. The Commonwealth rarely has direct evidence of an agreement. The agreement and shared purpose are instead constructed from conduct.

Did Henderson Have to Personally Carry the Knife?

No.

For armed robbery based on joint venture liability, the Commonwealth had to prove either that Henderson himself was armed or that he knew his coventurer was armed.

There was evidence from which the jury could find that Henderson actually possessed a knife. Vasquez suffered seventeen knife wounds, and the medical examiner identified two different types of wounds. Some were consistent with a knife having one sharp and one blunt edge, while others appeared to have been produced by a blade with two sharp edges. Trongeau had been seen carrying what could account for one category of wounds. From that evidence, the jury could infer that Henderson used a second knife. The SJC also noted blurry surveillance footage that could have permitted the jury to find that Henderson entered with a knife clipped to his pocket and fled holding one in his hand.

But the Court made clear that the case did not depend upon proving Henderson personally had a knife.

Even if Henderson did not know beforehand that Trongeau was armed, the jury could find that he learned of the weapon during the crime and nevertheless continued participating in the robbery. Once Henderson became aware that Trongeau had a knife, his continued participation could establish his liability as a joint venturer.

That is an important point for Massachusetts joint venture cases. A defendant does not necessarily escape liability merely because the Commonwealth cannot prove that he knew about a weapon before the crime began. The critical question may become what the defendant knew as events unfolded and what he did after acquiring that knowledge.

Felony-Murder Still Required Proof of the Necessary Intent

The SJC did not treat participation in an armed robbery as automatically sufficient for first-degree felony-murder.

The Commonwealth still had to prove that Henderson participated in the armed robbery with the necessary homicide-related mental state: an intent to kill, an intent to cause grievous bodily harm, or an intent to engage in conduct that, in the circumstances known to him, a reasonable person would recognize as creating a plain and strong likelihood of death.

The evidence was sufficient.

The jury could have concluded that Henderson personally stabbed Vasquez. Vasquez's blood was found on Henderson's discarded clothing, including on the upper back portion of his underwear, which the Commonwealth argued was consistent with placing a bloody knife into the back of his pants following the attack.

But again, the SJC did not make Henderson's liability depend entirely upon proof that he personally stabbed the victim.

The Court rejected Henderson's argument that the jury's refusal to convict him of murder based on deliberate premeditation or extreme atrocity or cruelty meant that it must have rejected the theory that he participated in the stabbing. Courts do not speculate about why a jury accepted one theory and rejected another.

More importantly, the SJC held that even if the jury were not convinced that Henderson wielded a knife, his continued participation in the robbery after the stabbing had begun could support the conclusion that he shared Trongeau's intent to kill or cause grievous bodily harm.

That may be the most practically important part of the opinion.

In a Massachusetts felony-murder joint venture case, the focus is not limited to the defendant's intentions at the exact moment the underlying felony began. A jury may consider what the defendant learned while the crime was underway and whether he continued to participate after becoming aware of the violence being committed by a coventurer.

Consciousness of Guilt Was Part of the Circumstantial Case

The SJC also relied on evidence of Henderson's conduct after the killing.

He discarded the bloody clothing he had been wearing, and when police arrested him approximately a week and a half later, he possessed identification in another person's name and a one-way bus ticket to South Carolina purchased under that identity.

The Court treated that evidence as consciousness of guilt which, when combined with the other evidence, added to the Commonwealth's circumstantial case.

As always, consciousness-of-guilt evidence does not independently establish the elements of the offense. But Henderson demonstrates how the SJC considers it as one piece of a larger evidentiary picture when reviewing sufficiency.

No Larceny Instruction Was Required

Henderson's second argument concerned the trial judge's failure to instruct the jury that it could find him guilty of larceny rather than armed robbery.

The SJC acknowledged that the evidence could have supported a larceny conviction. But Henderson had never requested the instruction.

More importantly, a larceny instruction would have been inconsistent with the defense actually presented at trial.

Henderson testified that he had been in the wrong place at the wrong time and had accidentally grabbed Vasquez's backpack while fleeing from Trongeau, whom he had just seen stabbing Vasquez. That theory denied the intent permanently to deprive Vasquez of his property—an element necessary for larceny.

Trial counsel had therefore made a tactical choice: seek an acquittal rather than give the jury a lesser theft offense as an alternative.

The SJC held that the decision was not manifestly unreasonable and that the trial judge had no obligation to give a larceny instruction on his own.

That portion of Henderson is a useful reminder about lesser included offense instructions. The mere fact that evidence could support a lesser offense does not necessarily require a judge to give the instruction sua sponte. Where the defense has deliberately pursued an all-or-nothing strategy that is inconsistent with the lesser offense, the absence of the instruction may be entirely proper.

What Commonwealth v. Henderson Means for Massachusetts Felony-Murder Cases

Henderson illustrates how broadly a jury may examine the course of conduct in determining joint venture liability.

The Commonwealth did not need a recorded conversation in which Henderson and Trongeau agreed to rob Vasquez. The SJC permitted the jury to infer the plan from where Henderson parked, who entered the apartment, who waited in the car, what Henderson carried out, and how the men fled.

Nor was the Commonwealth necessarily required to establish that Henderson entered the apartment already knowing that Trongeau had a knife. His continued participation after becoming aware of the weapon could support joint venture liability.

And for felony-murder, the Court focused on the defendant's participation as the violence unfolded. Even if the jury was uncertain that Henderson personally stabbed Vasquez, it could find the necessary intent from his continued participation in the armed robbery once the stabbing had begun.

For defense lawyers, that makes the chronology of a joint venture particularly important. Questions about what the defendant knew, when he knew it, what realistic opportunity he had to withdraw, and what conduct occurred before and after that knowledge may determine whether evidence supports simple presence, participation in an underlying felony, or liability for a homicide committed by somebody else.

The SJC ultimately affirmed Henderson's convictions for armed robbery and first-degree felony-murder and declined to reduce the verdict or grant a new trial under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.

Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP represents individuals charged with murder, armed robbery, joint venture offenses, and other serious criminal charges throughout Massachusetts. These cases often turn on precisely what a defendant knew, intended, and did—not simply on who was present when the crime occurred.