Interpreter Failures and a First-Degree Murder Reversal: What the Lozada Case Means for Criminal Trials in Massachusetts
In a powerful decision with implications for due process, witness credibility, and the constitutional rights of the accused, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court recently affirmed the grant of a new trial in Commonwealth v. Sammy Lozada, SJC-12985. The Court upheld the trial judge’s finding that the testimony of a key prosecution witness—who was deaf, illiterate, and severely language-deprived—was improperly admitted without a statutorily required determination that the interpreters were competent to accurately translate her testimony.
At Benzaken, Maguire, Sheehan & Wood, LLP, we pay close attention to rulings like this because they reinforce what we already know as Brockton criminal defense attorneys: when the government plays fast and loose with the rules, wrongful convictions can happen—and must be corrected.
Let’s break down the Lozada case, how it unfolded, and what it means for anyone facing serious charges in Massachusetts.
Background: A Fatal Stabbing and a Key Eyewitness
In the early morning hours of April 28, 2017, a man named Carlos Ramos was stabbed to death in a Holyoke apartment. The Commonwealth’s theory was that the defendant, Sammy Lozada, committed the killing during an armed robbery involving a stolen tablet.
The case against Lozada relied heavily on the testimony of two people:
Jose Espada, a homeless man who initially claimed Lozada robbed him of his tablet and later brought him to the scene of the stabbing.
Maria Samot, a deaf and severely language-deprived woman who lived in the apartment where the killing occurred.
Espada testified under a cooperation agreement. But it was Samot’s testimony that the Commonwealth emphasized most, portraying her as an unbiased eyewitness who saw Lozada stab Ramos with a black-handled knife.
The Problem: No Determination of Interpreter Competence
Samot does not use American Sign Language (ASL) or any formal language. Instead, she communicates through a set of highly individualized gestures rooted in her cultural background. Despite this, her testimony at trial was translated by two certified deaf interpreters and two ASL interpreters—none of whom had specialized training in interpreting for severely language-deprived individuals.
More importantly, the trial judge never made the mandatory finding under G. L. c. 221, § 92A, which requires that before a deaf person’s testimony is admitted, the judge must determine—based on evidence—that the interpreters can communicate accurately with that witness.
That step was skipped.
The results were predictably troubling. Samot’s answers during cross-examination were often nonresponsive, repeatedly stating that “he stabbed him” in response to unrelated questions. The defense was unable to meaningfully confront or challenge her testimony. Yet her repeated accusations—though linguistically garbled—remained before the jury.
Motion for New Trial: What the Defense Argued
After his conviction for first-degree murder and related offenses, Lozada filed a motion for a new trial, arguing that:
The court violated G. L. c. 221, § 92A, by allowing Samot’s testimony without the required threshold determination of interpreter competence.
The interpretation provided was unreliable and misleading, producing a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice.
His trial attorney was ineffective for failing to challenge the admissibility of Samot’s testimony or move to strike her nonresponsive answers.
The trial judge—who also presided over the original trial—held a four-day evidentiary hearing. The defense presented expert testimony from three scholars and professionals experienced in working with language-deprived individuals. All agreed: Samot's testimony could not be accurately interpreted without specialized methods and tools that were never used.
The judge found that the statutory violation severely undermined the fairness of the trial and allowed the motion for a new trial. The Commonwealth appealed.
The Supreme Judicial Court Affirms: No Abuse of Discretion
In a unanimous decision issued on July 17, 2025, the Supreme Judicial Court affirmed the trial judge’s ruling.
Key Findings:
The defendant has standing to invoke § 92A. The statute does not just protect deaf or hearing-impaired witnesses—it protects anyone with a stake in the trial from being subjected to unreliable, unverified translated testimony.
The statute is mandatory. The word “shall” in § 92A means what it says: no deaf or hearing-impaired witness’s testimony may be admitted unless the trial judge first finds the interpreter is able to communicate accurately with the witness.
There was a substantial risk of a miscarriage of justice. Samot’s testimony came in despite numerous signs that the interpreters were not accurately translating her meaning. The judge’s failure to comply with the statute tainted the trial.
Samot’s testimony was central to the Commonwealth’s case. Without her, the case would have rested almost entirely on Espada—a cooperating witness whose own credibility was shaky. Samot was the only witness to place the black-handled knife in Lozada’s hands and the only one to directly claim he committed the stabbing.
Trial counsel’s failure to object was not strategic. The judge credited counsel’s admission that he simply failed to consider the need for a § 92A hearing and did not move to strike nonresponsive answers because he didn't know how.
Why This Case Matters
This case is about much more than interpreter selection. It’s a warning about what happens when the justice system cuts corners—especially in cases involving vulnerable witnesses and defendants facing life sentences.
It also reinforces the role of skilled criminal defense attorneys in identifying and challenging violations of law and procedure.
At Benzaken, Maguire, Sheehan & Wood, LLP, we understand the human stories behind every file. In Commonwealth v. Lozada, a man's freedom depended on whether a trial judge followed a simple—but vital—rule designed to protect the integrity of the trial. That rule was ignored, and the result was a conviction based on deeply flawed evidence.
The Court’s ruling restores fairness and accountability.
Lessons for Brockton Criminal Defendants and Families
If you or a loved one is facing serious charges, here’s what the Lozada case teaches us:
1. Interpreters Must Be Qualified—Legally and Practically
Not all interpreters are equal. And even a certified interpreter may be unqualified to interpret for someone with unique communication needs. A defense attorney must demand that courts follow statutory requirements before testimony is admitted.
2. Cross-Examination Must Be Effective
The right to confront witnesses is meaningless if the witness cannot understand the questions or give responsive answers. If a witness keeps repeating “he stabbed him” in response to unrelated questions, and the defense cannot probe that testimony, the trial is not fair.
3. Trial Judges Must Protect the Process
Massachusetts law places the burden on the trial judge to ensure that interpreters are competent and communication is reliable before allowing any testimony from a deaf or hearing-impaired witness. This isn’t optional. It’s required.
4. Trial Errors Can Be Corrected—Even Years Later
This case proves that even after a conviction, a skilled appellate or post-conviction attorney can get a new trial if legal requirements were violated. Lozada was convicted in 2019. He got his new trial in 2025.
We’re Watching—and We’re Fighting
As Brockton criminal defense lawyers, we’re constantly watching for legal developments that affect our clients’ rights and futures. Commonwealth v. Sammy Lozada is one of those cases.
It’s a reminder that language access, due process, and the right to effective representation are not luxuries—they are essentials. And when the system fails, we fight to set it right.
If you or someone you love is facing a homicide charge, a serious felony, or a wrongful conviction, call our office today. We know the law. We know the system. And we know how to challenge illegal and unfair practices—whether in trial or on appeal.