Does Commonwealth v. Fitzsimmons Mean Jail Is Presumed After a Violation of Release Conditions?

Recent discussion of the Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. Fitzsimmons has raised an important question for defendants and defense attorneys alike:
Once a person violates or cannot comply with release conditions under the 276, 58A, does the Commonwealth no longer have to consider less restrictive alternatives?

The short answer is no.
The longer answer matters.

Below are the key questions—and what Fitzsimmons actually says.

Q: Did the SJC create a “jail presumption” once release conditions fail?

No.
Fitzsimmons does not create a presumption that jail automatically follows a violation or noncompliance with conditions.

Massachusetts law remains clear:

• Pretrial detention under G. L. c. 276, § 58A is the exception, not the rule.

• The Commonwealth must still prove by clear and convincing evidence that no conditions of release will reasonably assure public safety.

• If conditions can reasonably assure safety, the court must impose the least restrictive combination of conditions.

Nothing in Fitzsimmons alters that statutory framework.

Q: Then why did detention follow in Fitzsimmons?

Because the conditions that made release possible collapsed, and no workable substitute was timely or adequately presented.

In Fitzsimmons:

• The judge had already determined which conditions were the least restrictive means of assuring public safety.

• Alcohol abstinence, enforced by SCRAM testing, was a core safety condition, not a peripheral one.

• The court found that the defendant could not physically comply with SCRAM testing.

• The proposed alternative, urine testing, would have required frequent travel, undermining strict home confinement and other safety controls.

On that record, the judge concluded that no viable set of conditions remained that could reasonably assure safety.

That is not a presumption.
It is a finding based on evidence—or the lack of it.

Q: Does the Commonwealth get “let off the hook” once a defendant violates conditions?

No.
But Fitzsimmons clarifies what the hook actually is.

The Commonwealth is not required to:

• Invent hypothetical alternatives;

• Accept substitutes that undermine other safety-critical conditions;

• Reopen a dangerousness hearing absent new, material information under § 58A(4).

What the Commonwealth must still do is defend the judge’s finding that no workable alternative exists on the record before the court.

In Fitzsimmons, the SJC held that this burden was met.

Q: Does it matter whether the violation was willful?

Yes—conceptually and practically.

Notably, Fitzsimmons was not a classic willful-violation case. The judge found the defendant unable to comply, not defiant.

But inability to comply can be just as consequential as refusal when:

• The condition is essential to public safety; and

• The court cannot safely replicate its effect through other means.

The lesson is not that violations equal jail, but that essential safety conditions must remain enforceable.

Q: Was the judge required to adopt a “less restrictive” alternative once SCRAM failed?

Only if that alternative could reasonably assure public safety.

Section 58A does not require courts to choose any alternative, only those that actually work.

In Fitzsimmons:

• The proposed urine testing conflicted with house arrest;

• Same-day testing conflicted with advance-notice requirements;

• Defense counsel conceded these conflicts;

• No fully integrated alternative plan was presented at the critical hearing.

The SJC made clear that judges are not required to dismantle one safety condition to preserve another.

Q: Can a defendant seek release again after detention under Fitzsimmons?

Yes. Explicitly.

The SJC emphasized that detention is not permanent and that nothing prevents a defendant from moving to reopen the issue if:

• New information becomes available;

• Circumstances materially change; and

• A concrete, workable release plan can be shown to reasonably assure safety.

That language is inconsistent with any notion of an automatic detention rule.

Q: What is the real takeaway from Fitzsimmons?

The real takeaway is procedural, not punitive:

Once a court has crafted a least-restrictive safety plan under § 58A, a defendant seeking modification must present a complete, workable substitute, not just a narrower request to remove one condition.

Fitzsimmons reinforces judicial discretion, but it does not dilute the Commonwealth’s burden, erase individualized analysis, or create a shortcut to incarceration.

Bottom Line

Commonwealth v. Fitzsimmons does not stand for the proposition that “once you mess up your conditions of release, if you’ve been found dangerous, then jail is presumed.”

It stands for something more precise, and more defensible:

When essential safety conditions fail, and no equally protective alternative is shown, detention may lawfully follow.

That distinction matters—especially in dangerousness litigation.