Commonwealth v. Palmer: A Fractured Appeals Court and the Power of Dissent
By Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP — Massachusetts Criminal Defense Lawyers
On September 19, 2025, the Massachusetts Appeals Court issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Byron Palmer, No. 24-P-365. At first glance, the case looks like a typical suppression dispute: police saw a man they thought resembled a suspect in an old robbery video, moved in, the man ran, drugs were discarded, and the arrest followed.
But the case produced something unusual: a fractured Appeals Court with multiple concurring and dissenting opinions. The disagreement runs deep — not just over when Palmer was stopped, but whether the officers ever had enough facts to justify that stop under Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
The outcome — affirming Palmer’s conviction — is troubling enough. But the real story of Palmer lies in its dissents, especially Justice Massing’s. His opinion highlights the constitutional dangers of vague identifications, racial descriptors, and judicial deference to thin government proof.
For defense lawyers in Boston, Brockton, and across Massachusetts, Palmer is both a warning and a resource.
The Background
In January 2021, a man was robbed and shot at the Mildred Hailey Apartments in Jamaica Plain. The suspect was caught on surveillance video, masked and wearing distinctive clothing: a two-toned jacket, sneakers, and a checkered baseball cap.
Twelve days later, a Boston Housing Authority sergeant monitoring live video reported seeing the same person. Boston police converged on the scene. When they approached Palmer, he ran. Uniformed officers chased him; during flight, Palmer discarded cash and plastic bags later determined to contain cocaine.
At trial, Palmer was acquitted of all charges related to the robbery and firearms. He was convicted only of possession of cocaine with intent to distribute. On appeal, he challenged the denial of his motion to suppress the drugs, arguing the police lacked reasonable suspicion at the time he was seized.
The Split
The Appeals Court split three ways:
Plurality (upholding conviction): A majority agreed Palmer was seized no later than the moment he fled and officers pursued. Thirteen justices held that the identifications — combined with Palmer’s flight — provided reasonable suspicion.
Concurring justices: Some argued Palmer was not even seized until he was physically blocked. On this view, the drugs were “abandoned” before any stop occurred.
Dissenters (Massing, Shin, and others): Eleven justices rejected the majority’s reasoning, warning that Palmer was stopped on vague and racially coded descriptions, without a sufficient evidentiary basis.
The bottom line: conviction affirmed, but only by a fractured court.
Justice Massing’s Dissent: A Defense Lawyer’s Roadmap
Justice Peter J. Rubin Massing’s dissent deserves special attention. More than a disagreement with the majority, it is a systematic dismantling of the idea that Palmer’s stop was justified.
1. Vague Identifications Are Not Enough
Massing emphasized that the identification of Palmer rested on generic descriptors:
“Dark-skinned male”
Dreadlocks
A baseball cap
These characteristics, he wrote, are “so broad as to sweep in countless other people.” In a city as diverse as Boston, such descriptors apply to hundreds — if not thousands — of men. To elevate them into reasonable suspicion is to invite arbitrary enforcement.
2. Race and Article 14
The dissent did not shy away from the racial implications. Using skin tone as a basis for suspicion, Massing explained, risks turning race itself into a proxy for guilt. Article 14 demands specificity. Allowing police to stop someone based on race and hairstyle is exactly the kind of overbroad authority the Constitution was designed to guard against.
For defense lawyers, this point is critical. It arms us with constitutional language to challenge police stops that rest on nothing more than racialized assumptions.
3. Time Gap Weakens Suspicion
The robbery occurred twelve days earlier. The suspect in the video was masked. Details like clothing and hats are easily changed. For Massing, the time lapse undermined the reliability of the identification.
A two-week-old video showing generic features cannot justify seizing a man without more. Yet the majority allowed it.
4. Flight Does Not Cure Weak Suspicion
Perhaps most importantly, Massing underscored that Palmer’s flight should not salvage the stop. He invoked Commonwealth v. Warren (2016), where the SJC recognized that flight by Black men in Boston has “little or no probative value” because of the city’s history of disproportionate police encounters.
Seven officers converging on Palmer was enough to trigger fear and avoidance. Running in that situation was not proof of guilt, but a natural human reaction.
Massing’s point here is devastating: to allow vague descriptors plus flight to equal reasonable suspicion is to create a dangerous shortcut. Police could target any young Black man, and if he ran, claim suspicion. That flips Article 14 on its head.
5. The Broader Warning
Massing warned that the majority’s reasoning risks creating a regime where:
Generic racial descriptors suffice.
Police don’t need specific, articulable facts.
Courts defer to thin government claims.
That, he cautioned, erodes constitutional protections not just for Palmer, but for everyone.
Justice Shin’s Dissent: The Burden Remains on the Commonwealth
Justice Shin’s dissent, though briefer, sharpened the procedural point. He emphasized that the collective knowledge doctrine — allowing officers to rely on each other — does not let the Commonwealth skip its burden in court.
At the suppression hearing, the Commonwealth relied on Detective Eng’s testimony that Sergeant O’Donnell said, “Your guy is back.” But O’Donnell herself never testified. The Commonwealth never presented the facts she relied upon.
Shin warned that this failure was fatal. Courts must insist that the Commonwealth present specific, articulable facts, not conclusory assertions. Otherwise, Article 14 protections become meaningless.
For defense counsel, Shin’s dissent is a reminder to always demand the underlying evidence behind any tip or officer-to-officer communication.
Why the Majority Holding is Troubling
From a defense perspective, the plurality’s holding is troubling on several levels:
It lowers the bar for suspicion. Race, hairstyle, and a hat became enough to justify a stop.
It erodes Article 14 protections. By accepting an unsubstantiated tip, the court shifted the burden away from the Commonwealth.
It fragments the law. With concurrences and dissents pulling in different directions, trial judges lack clear guidance — a recipe for uneven justice.
Key Takeaways for Defense Lawyers
Hammer the timing of the stop. Argue that pursuit itself is a seizure under Stoute and Barros. Don’t let the Commonwealth push the seizure later to avoid scrutiny.
Demand proof, not conclusions. If the Commonwealth relies on a tip, force them to produce the officer or the facts behind it.
Challenge vague descriptors. Use Massing’s dissent to argue that race and common clothing cannot justify stops.
Limit the role of flight. Invoke Warren to show that flight has little probative value in communities with histories of over-policing.
Preserve every issue for appeal. With doctrine unsettled, suppression battles may be won at higher courts.
Broader Implications: Drug and Gun Cases
Although Palmer was convicted on a drug charge, the principles apply broadly to gun cases and other prosecutions where stops are the gateway to evidence.
In drug cases, vague tips and generic descriptions are common. Palmer warns us to demand more.
In gun cases, police often stretch suspicion thin because of the high stakes. Defense counsel must resist stops based on racialized or generic descriptors.
For clients in Boston, Brockton, and across Massachusetts, the fight over suppression can be the difference between conviction and dismissal.
Conclusion: The Value of Dissent
Commonwealth v. Palmer leaves the law unsettled. But its dissents — especially Justice Massing’s — give defense lawyers powerful tools. Massing’s opinion explains in plain terms why vague, racialized identifications cannot justify a stop. Shin’s opinion reminds us that the Commonwealth must carry its burden in court.
For defense attorneys, these dissents are not just commentary — they are blueprints for litigation. They show how to challenge stops, how to argue Article 14, and how to protect clients against the erosion of constitutional rights.
At Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP, we take these lessons seriously. As Massachusetts criminal defense lawyers, we will continue to press every suppression issue, to argue from the dissents when the majority falls short, and to fight for our clients’ rights in Boston, Brockton, and throughout the Commonwealth.
Call to Action
If you are facing a drug charge or a gun case in Massachusetts, the timing and justification of the police stop may decide your future.
Need a Boston suppression lawyer who knows how to use cases like Palmer to fight unconstitutional stops?
Looking for aggressive Brockton drug and gun lawyers who will challenge vague and racially coded identifications?
Want a Massachusetts criminal defense lawyer who stays ahead of the appellate curve?
Call Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP today at (508) 897-0001 for a confidential consultation.