Commonwealth v. John Larace (2025): Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court Clarifies Speedy-Trial Rights in the Wake of COVID-19
By Joshua J. Wood, Esq.
Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP – Brockton Criminal Defense Attorneys
Introduction
The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. John Larace, decided October 3, 2025, is a landmark case for anyone practicing criminal defense in the Commonwealth. It provides the first comprehensive post-pandemic interpretation of what counts—and what does not—toward a defendant’s right to a speedy trial under both state and federal law.
The Court confronted a question many lawyers have wrestled with since 2020: when courts shut down during COVID-19, did that time still count against the Commonwealth for purposes of Rule 36 or constitutional speedy-trial rights? The answer, according to the Supreme Judicial Court, is no. Pandemic-related delays do not weigh against the prosecution under either Rule 36 or the Sixth Amendment.
But the case does much more than resolve a technical counting problem. It defines how Massachusetts courts should handle future delays caused by administrative crises, discovery issues, or changes in representation—offering a roadmap for lawyers navigating congested dockets and extended continuances.
The Story Behind the Case
On the morning of February 24, 2019, 38-year-old John Larace went on what police later described as a “fifteen-minute crime spree.” After consuming methamphetamine, he attempted to break into a house, fought with a homeowner, pointed a gun at multiple motorists, and tried to enter another residence before being subdued.
The spree resulted in a twenty-one-count indictment involving seven victims. Charges included armed assault with intent to rob, multiple counts of assault and battery with a dangerous weapon, armed carjacking, breaking and entering, possession of burglarious tools, and unlawful possession of a firearm as a third offense.
Larace was arraigned in May 2019 and held on $100,000 cash bail. What followed was a long and winding procedural path—one that ultimately stretched more than four years between arraignment and trial.
The Four-Year Delay
The Court meticulously reconstructed the timeline.
April 2019: Indictments issued in Hampden County Superior Court.
May 2019: Arraignment and motion for discovery filed.
Late 2019: Delays begin due to missing grand jury minutes and incomplete ballistics reports.
March 2020 – October 2021: All jury trials in Massachusetts are suspended under Supreme Judicial Court emergency orders.
2022: Additional delays as Larace cycles through multiple attorneys, moves to represent himself, then asks for new counsel, and later requests continuances to develop a mental-health defense.
January 17, 2023: Jury-waived trial finally begins.
February 2023: Verdicts returned on numerous charges.
Larace’s appeal challenged the legitimacy of this delay. His defense team argued that the Commonwealth’s failure to bring the case to trial within twelve months violated both Rule 36 and the constitutional right to a speedy trial guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment and Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
The Rule 36 Claim: How the Court Calculated Delay
What Rule 36 Requires
Rule 36 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure states that a defendant must be tried within twelve months of arraignment. If the trial occurs later, the defendant is presumptively entitled to dismissal—unless the Commonwealth can justify the delay.
However, the rule allows certain exclusions. These include delays caused by hearings on motions, time when motions are under advisement, the unavailability of witnesses, or continuances granted “in the interests of justice.”
The Impact of COVID-19
The most significant chunk of delay in Larace’s case resulted from the pandemic. Beginning March 13, 2020, the Supreme Judicial Court suspended all jury trials to protect public health. These suspensions lasted, in various forms, until March 2022.
The Court held that because those administrative orders specifically excluded pandemic time from Rule 36 calculations, none of those months could be counted against the Commonwealth. In effect, the pandemic froze the clock.
Discovery and Pre-Trial Delays
Before COVID struck, discovery disputes already had slowed the case. The Commonwealth was late producing grand jury minutes and a ballistics report. But the trial judge found that those delays were due to resource shortages, not bad faith, and that granting short continuances served the “ends of justice.”
The Court agreed. It explained that defense counsel could have filed a motion for sanctions under Rule 14 if they wanted to contest the delay, but they did not. Because the defense neither renewed its motion to compel nor sought sanctions, the Court treated that period as excluded.
Motions Under Advisement
When Larace chose to represent himself, he filed a flurry of pro se motions—motions to suppress, to dismiss, and to strike habitual-offender enhancements. Hearings occurred, but many of the motions remained undecided for months. The Court reaffirmed the rule that judges can exclude up to thirty days while a motion is under advisement. Beyond that, delay counts toward the Rule 36 clock unless it overlaps with another valid exclusion, such as a COVID-related closure.
Changes in Representation
Throughout 2020 and 2021, Larace switched lawyers multiple times, represented himself briefly, then asked for counsel to be reappointed. The Court ruled that such periods are excludable because a defendant “benefits from delay” when it allows new counsel to prepare adequately.
In practical terms, every time Larace changed attorneys, the clock stopped. The Court emphasized that Massachusetts law recognizes that a represented defendant is better protected, and the process of appointing or transitioning counsel cannot fairly be charged against the Commonwealth.
Defense Continuances and New Theories
After new counsel entered in mid-2022, the defense sought additional time to pursue a mental-health defense requiring expert testimony. The judge granted the continuance over the Commonwealth’s objection. Because the continuance was requested by the defense and explicitly found to serve the interests of justice, that time was excluded as well.
The Commonwealth’s Continuances
Near the end of the timeline, the prosecution sought a brief postponement to accommodate witness schedules during the holiday season. The Court held that short continuances for “essential witness availability,” supported by specific findings, are valid under Rule 36(b)(2)(F). The trial judge had made those findings on the record.
The Bottom Line on Rule 36
After reviewing every segment of the four-year delay, the Supreme Judicial Court concluded that fewer than 365 “non-excluded” days had elapsed between arraignment and trial. The Rule 36 clock had not expired. The motion to dismiss was properly denied.
The Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial
Even if no Rule 36 violation occurs, a defendant may still claim that the total delay was unconstitutional. Larace raised that argument as well, invoking both the Sixth Amendment and Article 11 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
The Court applied the familiar four-factor test from Barker v. Wingo (1972):
The length of the delay
The reason for the delay
The defendant’s assertion of the right
The prejudice to the defendant
1. Length of the Delay
A nearly four-year gap between arraignment and trial is long enough to trigger full constitutional review. The Court acknowledged the delay was “presumptively prejudicial” but emphasized that length alone is never dispositive.
2. Reason for the Delay
Here, the pandemic dominated the timeline. The Court refused to weigh COVID-related delays against the Commonwealth, noting that they were caused by judicial orders, not prosecutorial neglect. The Court treated those months as “neutral” for constitutional purposes.
Other causes—like discovery production, attorney changes, and defense continuances—were either neutral or attributable to the defense. Only a small fraction of delay could conceivably be blamed on the Commonwealth, and that portion was not long enough to tip the scale.
3. Assertion of the Right
The Court next examined when and how Larace demanded a speedy trial. He did raise the issue several times, filing motions to dismiss under Rule 36. However, he also requested continuances and changes in representation that extended the case. The justices concluded that his actions were inconsistent with a genuine desire for a prompt trial.
4. Prejudice to the Defendant
Finally, the Court analyzed prejudice. Speedy-trial prejudice generally involves three harms: oppressive pre-trial incarceration, anxiety, and impairment of defense.
Larace had been held for a significant period pre-trial, but much of that time was during the pandemic when courts were closed. The Court found no evidence that witnesses’ memories had faded or that the defense was materially impaired. Without concrete prejudice, and given that most of the delay was justified, the Court held there was no constitutional violation.
Key Takeaways for Defense Attorneys
1. COVID-19 Time Is Excluded From Both Rule 36 and Constitutional Analysis
The Supreme Judicial Court explicitly held that pandemic-related delays resulting from its own administrative orders do not count against the Commonwealth for either statutory or constitutional speedy-trial purposes. This ruling provides a definitive answer to one of the most contested issues of the past five years.
2. Passive Delay Is Dangerous
If discovery drags or motions go unanswered, defense counsel must actively object. The Court stressed that defendants who sit silently or join in removing hearing dates from the calendar will be deemed to have “acquiesced.” Filing a motion for sanctions under Rule 14 is the correct way to preserve objections.
3. Representation Changes Toll the Clock
When a defendant changes lawyers or requests new counsel, the time consumed by that transition benefits the defense and is excluded. Lawyers should account for this in any Rule 36 analysis and make clear on the record who requested each continuance.
4. “Ends of Justice” Findings Matter
Judges must make explicit or at least implicit findings that a continuance serves the ends of justice. Defense lawyers should listen carefully at hearings: if the judge fails to make those findings, request that they be added to preserve the record.
5. Rule 36 and Constitutional Rights Are Separate
Even if Rule 36’s one-year period has not expired, a defendant can still argue a constitutional violation—but must show actual prejudice and unjustified prosecutorial delay. The two analyses overlap but are distinct.
6. Practical Implications Post-Pandemic
For cases still delayed by the COVID-19 backlog, Larace provides clear precedent that pandemic time is excluded. However, defense counsel should pivot to arguing other forms of delay—especially those tied to neglected discovery, missing witnesses, or excessive “under advisement” periods.
The Broader Significance
Commonwealth v. Larace will shape how trial judges handle speedy-trial motions for years to come. It demonstrates that Massachusetts courts are unwilling to punish the Commonwealth for the extraordinary circumstances of 2020–2022, but it also reaffirms that ordinary diligence rules still apply.
The decision encourages trial judges to make explicit findings about the cause of delay and to carefully document which periods are excluded. It also signals to defense lawyers that they must take a proactive stance—tracking the clock, objecting early, and documenting every delay on the record.
At a deeper level, Larace reflects the Court’s desire to balance fairness with realism. The pandemic created unprecedented barriers to trial. The SJC recognized that while defendants deserve prompt justice, courts cannot treat global emergencies as prosecutorial fault.
What This Means for Defendants in Massachusetts
If you or someone you love is facing criminal charges that have dragged on for years, Larace offers important guidance. While the decision narrows certain speedy-trial arguments tied to COVID-19, it also clarifies how to frame stronger claims in the future.
Delays caused by:
Late discovery production,
Judicial inaction,
Absent witnesses without findings, or
Prosecution-requested continuances lacking justification
can still violate both Rule 36 and the Constitution.
An experienced Massachusetts criminal defense attorney can review your docket, calculate the true Rule 36 timeline, and determine whether you have grounds to move for dismissal.
Conclusion
The Supreme Judicial Court’s decision in Commonwealth v. John Larace is the definitive word on how Massachusetts will treat pandemic-era and post-pandemic delays. It reinforces that defendants are entitled to a prompt trial, but also that extraordinary circumstances—like a global shutdown—do not count against the Commonwealth.
For defense lawyers, the lesson is to stay vigilant: track every delay, demand timely rulings, and assert your client’s rights at every stage.
For defendants, the takeaway is simple—time matters, but so does advocacy. A skilled criminal defense lawyer can make the difference between a case that drags for years and one that ends with a successful motion to dismiss.
Q&A: Understanding the Larace Decision
Q1: What did the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court decide in Commonwealth v. Larace?
The Court ruled that delays caused by the COVID-19 court shutdowns do not count against the prosecution for purposes of Rule 36 or constitutional speedy-trial rights. The defendant’s four-year delay did not violate either rule or constitutional protections.
Q2: Does COVID-19 time count toward the one-year Rule 36 limit?
No. The Supreme Judicial Court’s emergency orders automatically excluded that time from the speedy-trial calculation.
Q3: Can a defendant still win a constitutional speedy-trial claim after Larace?
Yes, but only if the delay was not justified—such as when the Commonwealth is negligent or a judge fails to make necessary findings. Pandemic delays alone are not enough.
Q4: What should defense lawyers do when discovery is delayed?
They should file a motion to compel and, if the delay continues, a motion for sanctions under Rule 14. Failing to act may be treated as consent to the delay.
Q5: How long can a case be delayed before it becomes unconstitutional?
There’s no fixed number. Courts look at the total delay, reasons for the delay, whether the defendant asserted the right, and whether the defense was prejudiced. Generally, only unjustified and harmful delays lead to dismissal.
If you’re facing criminal charges in Brockton, Plymouth, or anywhere in Massachusetts, and your case has dragged on for months or years, contact Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP today.
Our attorneys understand the nuances of Rule 36 and the constitutional right to a speedy trial—and we fight to make sure justice delayed does not become justice denied.