Commonwealth v. Jason Estabrook: The Massachusetts SJC Weighs In on Felony-Murder, Armed Home Invasion, and the Voluntariness of Confessions
On August 25, 2025, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts issued its decision in Commonwealth v. Jason Estabrook, SJC-13442, affirming a conviction of first-degree felony murder and armed home invasion. The opinion—authored by Justice Georges and joined by Chief Justice Budd and Justices Gaziano, Wendlandt, Dewar, and Wolohojian—provides a sweeping review of some of the most contested issues in Massachusetts criminal law: the scope of the felony-murder rule, the admissibility of confessions, the impact of Miranda warnings, the sufficiency of jury instructions, and the court’s extraordinary power of review under G.L. c. 278, § 33E.
For defense attorneys, prosecutors, and anyone facing serious charges in Massachusetts, Estabrook highlights how high the stakes are when homicide arises out of an armed home invasion, and how carefully appellate courts scrutinize claims of coercion, voluntariness, and improper jury instructions.
This blog post takes a deep dive into the case—its facts, its procedural history, the arguments raised on appeal, and what it means for criminal law in Massachusetts moving forward.
The Facts: A Botched Home Invasion Turns Deadly
The events began in the early morning of July 7, 2012, when Jason Estabrook, his cousin Adam Bradley, and several other men decided to rob a home in Billerica. Armed with handguns, several intruders forced their way into the kitchen, expecting to find money inside.
But the robbery went wrong almost immediately. The victim, Quintin Koehler, and his brother confronted the intruders. A violent struggle broke out. Koehler struck Estabrook with a tea kettle while trying to push him out of the home. During the fight, Koehler was fatally shot. The intruders fled without taking any money. Later, Estabrook showed up at a Salem emergency room with head and shoulder injuries consistent with having been hit during the struggle.
From the beginning, the case involved multiple perpetrators, conflicting accounts, and questions about who played what role. This set the stage for arguments about whether Estabrook was a minor participant, whether his confession was voluntary, and whether the felony-murder rule applied too harshly.
Police Interrogations and the Motion to Suppress
Much of the appeal focused on what Estabrook told police—and whether those statements should have been suppressed.
The Early Interviews
In August 2012, police first interviewed Estabrook while he was in custody on an unrelated matter. After being advised of his Miranda rights, he denied involvement and eventually invoked his right to counsel, ending the interview.
A week later, no longer in custody, Estabrook voluntarily met with detectives at the district attorney’s office. He again denied involvement and offered an alibi.
The Arrest and Sally Port Exchange
On September 26, 2012, Estabrook was arrested on the Billerica homicide charges. At booking, he appeared under the influence of Klonopin and reported mental health struggles, including depression and a prior suicide attempt. He asked to call his lawyer, but was told he would need to wait until booking was complete. He was placed in a cell overnight.
The next morning, sober, Estabrook was fingerprinted by Detective Roy Frost. In the sally port, Estabrook initiated a conversation, asking about his cousin Bradley. When Frost indicated Bradley had not been arrested but had been interviewed, Estabrook pressed for details. Frost eventually revealed that Bradley’s interview had been recorded. Estabrook asked to see it, and Frost said he would need to waive Miranda first.
The Recorded Confession
In a conference room, Estabrook received Miranda warnings again, signed a waiver, and watched an excerpt of Bradley’s interview. Seeing his cousin implicate him, Estabrook began making incriminating statements, including admitting his role in the robbery plan. Though he tried to minimize his involvement—claiming he was only supposed to push in the door—he nonetheless admitted facts that placed him at the scene and participating in the invasion.
The Trial: Felony-Murder Conviction
In 2016, Estabrook went to trial in Middlesex Superior Court before Judge Edward Leibensperger.
The jury convicted him of first-degree felony murder (with attempted armed robbery and armed home invasion as the predicate felonies).
He was also convicted of armed home invasion.
The attempted armed robbery conviction was dismissed as duplicative.
He was sentenced to life without parole on the murder conviction, plus 20–25 years concurrent on the home invasion
Two firearm charges were dropped before trial.
The Appeal: Issues Before the SJC
On appeal, Estabrook raised three primary issues:
Motion to Suppress
He argued his sally port conversation with Frost amounted to custodial interrogation without Miranda warnings.
He further argued that his later waiver and confession were involuntary due to his mental health, intoxication, and pressure from detectives.
Jury Instruction Error
He argued the trial judge misstated the elements of armed home invasion by using “voluntarily or intentionally” instead of “voluntarily and intentionally.”
Relief Under G.L. c. 278, § 33E
He sought reduction of the verdict or a new trial based on his allegedly limited role, his psychological and medical history, and the lighter sentences his co-defendants received.
The SJC rejected all three arguments and affirmed the convictions.
Issue One: Was the Confession Suppressed?
The Court’s Analysis
The SJC carefully reviewed whether the sally port conversation constituted custodial interrogation. The court held that Frost did not interrogate Estabrook—he merely responded to Estabrook’s own questions. Because Estabrook initiated the exchange, it was not the “functional equivalent of interrogation.” Frost even refused to discuss details until Miranda was administered.
When Estabrook was later Mirandized, the court found his waiver was voluntary. He was sober, coherent, educated, and familiar with the system. Though he had mental health struggles, there was no evidence those conditions prevented a knowing waiver. Importantly, Estabrook himself pressed to see the video and to talk about a possible deal. The detectives made no promises of leniency. The court emphasized the calm, conversational tone of the interview.
Lessons for Defense Lawyers
Massachusetts courts place great weight on who initiates the exchange. If the defendant asks questions, the court is unlikely to view police responses as interrogation.
Mental health struggles and past substance abuse do not automatically invalidate a Miranda waiver. The defense must show a direct connection between impairment and inability to make a voluntary choice.
Prior experience with the criminal justice system often counts against the defendant in these analyses, because it suggests familiarity with Miranda warnings.
Issue Two: Jury Instruction Error
Estabrook next challenged the trial judge’s instruction on armed home invasion. The model jury instruction requires that the defendant’s act be done “voluntarily and intentionally.” The judge instead said “voluntarily or intentionally.”
The SJC agreed this was a legal error but found it harmless. The judge clarified elsewhere that the jury must exclude mistake, accident, or other innocent reasons. The overall charge conveyed the correct law, and the jury had rejected Estabrook’s duress defense anyway. The court concluded there was no substantial likelihood of a miscarriage of justice.
Lessons for Defense Lawyers
Preservation is critical: because defense counsel did not object at trial, the standard on appeal was far more deferential. A timely objection could have forced a stricter review.
Even where model instructions exist, Massachusetts courts emphasize that they are not binding unless formally adopted by the SJC (such as the Model Jury Instructions on Homicide). Defense lawyers must be prepared to argue errors as legal misstatements, not just deviations from practice guides.
Issue Three: § 33E Relief
Finally, Estabrook asked the SJC to exercise its extraordinary power under G.L. c. 278, § 33E to reduce the verdict or grant a new trial. This statute requires the SJC to review the whole case in first-degree murder appeals and gives it broad discretion to grant relief.
Estabrook argued:
He had a limited role in the crimes.
His mental health, substance abuse, and history of lead poisoning diminished his culpability.
His coventurers received lighter sentences.
The SJC rejected these arguments. The evidence showed Estabrook was an active participant who planned to share in the proceeds, directed accomplices during the invasion, physically struggled with the victim, and even criticized others afterward for not following his directions. The court also emphasized that mental illness and intoxication alone do not warrant § 33E relief. Finally, sentencing disparities between co-defendants do not justify relief.
Lessons for Defense Lawyers
The SJC applies § 33E sparingly. Arguments based on “limited role” or “mental health struggles” face an uphill battle unless the evidence clearly supports diminished culpability.
Sentencing disparities, without more, almost never persuade the court.
Defense counsel must build a compelling mitigation record at trial if they hope to later argue for § 33E relief.
Broader Implications of the Case
1. Felony-Murder Rule Remains Firm
The SJC reaffirmed that active participation in a predicate felony like armed home invasion can sustain a conviction for first-degree felony murder, even if the defendant did not fire the fatal shot. For defendants, this means participation in a group crime can carry the same exposure as pulling the trigger.
2. Miranda Rights: The Importance of Defendant’s Initiative
The decision underscores that Miranda protections hinge not only on what police say but on how the conversation begins. If the defendant initiates talk about the case, courts are reluctant to view officers’ responses as interrogation.
3. Mental Health and Voluntariness
While mental health issues are relevant, Massachusetts courts require clear evidence that such impairments caused the waiver or confession to be involuntary. General struggles with depression or substance abuse will not suffice.
4. Jury Instruction Challenges
Errors in jury instructions may not win reversal unless counsel objects contemporaneously. Model instructions are guides, not law, unless approved by the SJC.
5. § 33E Review
The case confirms the SJC’s role as a backstop against injustice in first-degree murder convictions, but also shows the limits of that authority. Relief is rare absent overwhelming mitigation.
Key Takeaways for Clients Facing Serious Charges
If you or a loved one is facing homicide or armed home invasion charges in Massachusetts, Commonwealth v. Estabrook carries important lessons:
Confessions matter: Even statements made after watching a co-defendant’s interview can be used if Miranda warnings are given and the court finds voluntariness.
Silence is your right: Once you invoke your right to counsel, do not engage in further conversation with police.
Mental health history is important but not determinative: It must be directly linked to the voluntariness of your statement.
Appeals are limited: Errors not objected to at trial are very difficult to win on appeal.
Felony-murder is severe: You can be convicted of first-degree murder and sentenced to life without parole even if you did not pull the trigger.
Conclusion
Commonwealth v. Jason Estabrook is a stark reminder of how Massachusetts law treats felony-murder cases arising out of armed home invasions. The SJC upheld the conviction, finding no violation of Miranda, no reversible jury instruction error, and no basis for § 33E relief.
Call to Action
If you or a family member is under investigation or charged with homicide, armed robbery, or armed home invasion in Massachusetts, you need an experienced Boston criminal defense lawyer who knows how to challenge confessions, scrutinize police conduct, and fight felony-murder charges.
At Benzaken, Maguire, Sheehan & Wood, LLP, we have successfully defended clients in Middlesex, Suffolk, Plymouth, and across the Commonwealth against the most serious charges. Contact us today for a confidential consultation. Your future and freedom are too important to face alone.