Commonwealth v. Elana Gordon: The SJC Strikes Down “Substitute Expert” Drug Testimony
Massachusetts’ highest court reinforces the Confrontation Clause in forensic-evidence prosecutions
Overview
In Commonwealth v. Elana Gordon (SJC-13735, Sept. 17 2025), the Supreme Judicial Court revisited a critical constitutional fault line: can a substitute chemist testify about lab results prepared by an absent analyst? The Court’s answer—“no”—reshapes how prosecutors must prove the identity of controlled substances and fortifies the right of defendants to confront the actual witnesses against them.
At its core, Gordon reaffirms that when the Commonwealth relies on scientific testing to prove a crime, it must produce the scientist who performed that testing. The SJC vacated Gordon’s conviction, holding that the Commonwealth violated the Sixth Amendment’s Confrontation Clause by presenting a “reviewing” chemist in place of the original analyst who performed the gas-chromatography–mass-spectrometry (GC-MS) analysis.
This ruling has sweeping implications for drug-distribution, trafficking, and contraband-delivery cases across Massachusetts—especially those built on State Police Crime Lab certificates.
Background and Facts
In 2018, Elana Gordon—a practicing attorney—visited a client at the Plymouth County House of Correction. She brought two envelopes she described as legal paperwork. Correctional staff intercepted them and found sixty-one orange strips concealed among the papers. Suspecting Suboxone (a medication containing buprenorphine and naloxone, used to treat opioid dependence), officers seized the envelopes and sent them to the State Police Crime Lab for testing.
Analyst Kimberly Dunlap performed the chemical tests. She documented the screening and confirmatory GC-MS results in handwritten notes, concluding the substance contained buprenorphine and naloxone—a Class B controlled substance under Massachusetts law. Her supervisor, Carrie LaBelle, conducted a “technical and administrative review,” confirming the paperwork was properly completed and the data appeared consistent with Suboxone.
Before trial, the Commonwealth learned Dunlap no longer worked for the lab. Rather than locate her or secure her testimony, prosecutors called LaBelle to testify as a “substitute chemist.” LaBelle told jurors she independently reviewed Dunlap’s data and agreed with the conclusion that the strips contained Suboxone. On cross-examination, she admitted she had not observed the testing and relied entirely on Dunlap’s recorded data.
Gordon’s counsel objected and moved to strike the testimony, arguing that it violated her right to confront the person who performed the scientific work. The trial judge denied the motion but noted the objection “for the record.”
The jury convicted Gordon of delivering a Class B controlled substance to a prisoner, a felony under G.L. c. 268 § 28. She received a six-month sentence.
Procedural History
The Appeals Court affirmed the conviction, holding that LaBelle’s testimony was permissible because she offered an “independent expert opinion” based on data available in the file.
While Gordon’s petition for further appellate review was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Smith v. Arizona (602 U.S. 779 [2024]). There, the Court held that when a substitute expert merely repeats conclusions drawn by an absent analyst, the testimony violates the Confrontation Clause.
Following Smith, the U.S. Supreme Court granted Gordon’s petition, vacated the Appeals Court decision, and remanded for reconsideration. The SJC took the case on its own initiative and applied Smith to Massachusetts practice.
The Key Legal Issue
At the center of the case was a straightforward but far-reaching question:
Does a defendant’s constitutional right “to be confronted with the witnesses against her” prohibit the Commonwealth from calling a different chemist to testify about a lab report prepared by a non-testifying analyst?
The Commonwealth argued that LaBelle had formed her own independent opinion based on the underlying data and that her testimony did not rely on hearsay. The defense contended that LaBelle’s conclusions were inseparable from Dunlap’s statements and records, which were admitted for their truth without an opportunity for cross-examination.
The Court’s Holding
The Supreme Judicial Court unanimously vacated Gordon’s conviction. Justice Wendlandt, writing for the Court, held that the substitute-expert testimony violated both the Federal and State confrontation clauses.
Applying Smith v. Arizona, the Court concluded that:
The absent analyst’s notes were out-of-court statements offered for their truth.
Those statements were testimonial. The analyst prepared them for use in a criminal prosecution.
LaBelle’s opinion depended entirely on those statements. Her “independent conclusion” merely restated the absent analyst’s findings.
The error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Without LaBelle’s testimony, the Commonwealth had no admissible evidence identifying the substance as a controlled drug.
Accordingly, the SJC vacated the conviction and ordered entry of a finding of not guilty.
The Court’s Reasoning
1. The Sixth Amendment Right of Confrontation
The Court began by tracing the line of U.S. Supreme Court cases—Crawford v. Washington (2004), Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (2009), Bullcoming v. New Mexico (2011), and finally Smith v. Arizona (2024)—that transformed the law of forensic evidence. Under Crawford, testimonial statements of absent witnesses are inadmissible unless the defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine them. Melendez-Diaz specifically held that Massachusetts drug-certificates were testimonial. Bullcoming barred surrogate testimony by a colleague who merely reviewed another analyst’s report.
The Commonwealth argued that Smith left room for experts to base opinions on “machine-generated data.” The SJC agreed with that premise but found that LaBelle’s testimony went much further: she explicitly relied on Dunlap’s interpretation of those results. The analyst’s notes, not the machine output, formed the basis of the conclusion. Because those notes were testimonial and Dunlap was unavailable for cross-examination, admission of LaBelle’s testimony violated the Constitution.
2. No “Independent Opinion” Exception
The SJC rejected the Commonwealth’s claim that LaBelle’s testimony was “independent.” Reviewing the transcript, the Court observed that LaBelle repeatedly framed her opinion as confirming Dunlap’s analysis rather than generating her own. She had not re-tested the evidence or personally reviewed the raw GC-MS data in a way that produced a new scientific conclusion.
The Court noted that “an expert cannot evade the Confrontation Clause by relabeling another’s conclusions as her own.” When a testifying witness’s opinion depends on the truth of a non-testifying analyst’s statements, the defendant’s right to cross-examine that analyst is violated.
3. Harmless-Error Review
Because the confrontation error occurred at trial, the SJC assessed whether it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court found it was not. The only evidence that the seized strips contained a controlled substance came from LaBelle’s testimony, which itself depended on the inadmissible notes. Without it, no rational jury could find Gordon guilty.
4. Retroactivity
Finally, the SJC confirmed that Smith v. Arizona applied retroactively to Gordon’s case because it did not announce a “new rule” but clarified existing confrontation doctrine. This holding ensures that other Massachusetts defendants whose cases were tried before Smith can invoke its protections on direct appeal.
Significance for Massachusetts Criminal Law
A. Forensic Evidence Must Be Testified To by the Actual Analyst
Gordon cements a bright-line rule: the Commonwealth must produce the analyst who performed or directly observed the testing. A reviewing chemist’s testimony is admissible only if she independently analyzes raw data and draws a conclusion that does not rely on the absent analyst’s recorded statements.
This distinction will affect hundreds of cases where the State Police Crime Lab has experienced turnover or backlog. Prosecutors can no longer rely on a supervisory chemist’s “technical review” to introduce lab results.
B. Defense Counsel Should Aggressively Litigate Confrontation Motions
For defense lawyers, Gordon is a strategic roadmap. Before trial, counsel should file a motion in limine or motion to suppress seeking exclusion of any forensic evidence unless the testifying witness personally performed the analysis. Where a substitute analyst is proposed, counsel should demand detailed documentation of who did what, when, and under what lab protocols.
Cross-examination should highlight:
Whether the testifying expert observed the original testing;
Whether she repeated or replicated the test;
Whether she independently interpreted the raw data; and
Whether her conclusion depends on the absent analyst’s written or oral statements.
C. Implications Beyond Drug Cases
Although Gordon arose from a controlled-substance prosecution, the ruling’s reasoning extends to other forensic domains—DNA analysis, ballistics, and toxicology. Whenever the Commonwealth substitutes a different expert to summarize another’s work, the confrontation principles apply with equal force.
D. Systemic Impact on the State Police Crime Lab
The decision exposes a recurring vulnerability in the Commonwealth’s forensic system: analysts frequently leave their positions before cases reach trial. To comply with Gordon, the lab and prosecutors must improve retention or preserve testimony through pre-trial depositions. Otherwise, the Commonwealth risks dismissal of drug and contraband cases where no admissible identification evidence remains.
Lessons from the Case
Scientific evidence is only as strong as its witness. Data alone cannot convict; the person interpreting it must testify and withstand cross-examination.
Procedural shortcuts create appellate risk. Using a reviewing chemist might save time, but it invites reversal years later.
Defense lawyers must preserve confrontation objections at every stage. Even if the trial court overrules the objection, noting it “for the record” can preserve the issue for appeal—as happened here.
The harmless-error standard is demanding. When the Commonwealth’s case depends on tainted testimony, the SJC will not hesitate to reverse.
Broader Constitutional Context
1. The Legacy of Melendez-Diaz and Massachusetts’ Role
Ironically, Massachusetts has been at the center of the national conversation about forensic confrontation since Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts. That 2009 decision established that crime-lab certificates are testimonial statements requiring live testimony. Gordon brings the Commonwealth full circle—applying the latest U.S. Supreme Court guidance to reaffirm that principle.
2. Balancing Efficiency and Rights
The SJC acknowledged the administrative burden this rule places on prosecutors and crime labs but emphasized that constitutional rights cannot yield to convenience. The Court noted that the Commonwealth has tools—such as stipulations, pre-trial depositions, or expert-availability planning—to mitigate disruption. What it cannot do is replace one scientist’s sworn testimony with another’s after-the-fact review.
3. Restoring Confidence After the Lab Scandals
Massachusetts’ recent history—including the Annie Dookhan and Sonja Farak drug-lab scandals—has already eroded public trust in forensic evidence. By demanding strict adherence to confrontation principles, Gordon serves a dual purpose: protecting defendants and reinforcing public confidence that convictions rest on transparent, verifiable evidence.
Practical Takeaways for Defense Lawyers
A. Before Trial
Demand production of the testing analyst. File a written discovery request identifying each analyst whose work the Commonwealth intends to use.
Subpoena chain-of-custody and lab documentation. These materials often reveal whether a “technical reviewer” is substituting for the true analyst.
File a motion in limine to exclude surrogate testimony. Cite Gordon and Smith v. Arizona as controlling authority.
B. At Trial
Object the moment a witness begins to testify about another analyst’s work.
Cross-examine to show the “expert” is relying on someone else’s conclusions.
Request a curative instruction or move to strike if necessary.
C. On Appeal
Preserve the confrontation argument even if the trial court denies relief.
Argue that the error is not harmless because the Commonwealth lacks admissible proof of the controlled substance’s identity.
What This Means for Defendants in Massachusetts
If you—or someone you know—faces drug charges based on laboratory testing, Gordon changes the landscape. The prosecution must now prove the chain of custody and testing through live testimony by the analyst who performed the work. If that person is unavailable, the Commonwealth cannot simply substitute another chemist to read the file.
This means many defendants convicted on “substitute-chemist” testimony may have viable appellate or post-conviction claims. Defense lawyers should carefully review trial transcripts for any indication that a lab supervisor or reviewer, rather than the original analyst, testified about the test results.
Conclusion
Commonwealth v. Elana Gordon marks a decisive moment for criminal justice in Massachusetts. By vacating Gordon’s conviction, the SJC reaffirmed that the right to confrontation is not a procedural formality but a substantive guarantee that protects the integrity of the fact-finding process. Scientific evidence may be powerful, but it is not self-authenticating. Behind every report stands a human witness who must face cross-examination.
For defense attorneys, the lesson is clear: challenge every substitute expert. For prosecutors, the takeaway is equally stark: build your cases on admissible evidence, not administrative convenience.
About the Author
Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP is a Brockton-based criminal-defense firm representing clients across Massachusetts in complex state and federal prosecutions, including controlled-substance, firearms, and white-collar matters. Our attorneys follow every Supreme Judicial Court and Appeals Court decision that reshapes the landscape of criminal law, ensuring our clients receive the most informed and aggressive defense available.