Commonwealth v. Barry A. Hanson, Jr.: Why the Appeals Court Threw Out a Two-Apartment Search
There are cases that turn on a single moment of human behavior, and there are cases that turn on an inch of real estate. Commonwealth v. Barry A. Hanson, Jr., 24-P-870 (Dec. 2, 2025), is the latter. It is a case about doors, stairways, and a simple truth embedded in Article 14 of the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights: the police may search only the place a warrant authorizes them to search—nothing more.
The decision, authored by Justice Wood and joined by Justice Grant, affirms the suppression of firearms and other contraband found in a second-floor apartment that police entered without obtaining a separate warrant, even after learning that the defendant rented both apartments.
And for defense lawyers, it is a reminder of how often search-warrant litigation turns on the quiet details: mailboxes, doorways, apartment lines, and the architecture of multiunit homes.
Below is an analysis of the decision—its facts, its legal meaning, and what it teaches about search law in Massachusetts.
I. Background: A Two-Family House in Southbridge
Police suspected Barry Hanson of selling marijuana and related contraband. Their evidence had nothing to do with his home; all controlled buys took place offsite. What tied the house at 30 Golf Street to the criminal activity was surveillance showing Hanson leaving the front door of the first-floor apartment with bags and a shoebox just before meeting an undercover officer.
That surveillance was enough for a warrant—but only for the first-floor apartment. The warrant described:
“30 Golf Street, 1st-floor apartment… along with its basement, attic, storage sheds, garages, and curtilage associated with this residence.”
The building itself was a typical two-family house:
• two mailboxes
• two separate exterior entrances
• two separate apartments
• a two-level enclosed back porch connecting the floors
• separate back doors for each apartment
Inside lived Hanson, his girlfriend, and her children. According to the girlfriend, they treated the entire building as a single home.
When officers arrived to execute the warrant, they entered the first-floor apartment and were told by the girlfriend that Hanson rented and used both floors. Her son—wrapped in a towel—came through the back porch after showering upstairs. With her permission, officers followed him to the second floor so he could change clothes.
That brief, limited entry revealed two padlocked interior rooms and surveillance cameras.
At that moment, the police faced a choice.
They could:
(1) secure the house and apply for a new warrant, or
(2) assume the second floor was now fair game.
They chose the latter—retrieving keys and forcibly opening the padlocked rooms, finding firearms and other contraband.
Hanson moved to suppress all evidence found upstairs.
The motion judge agreed.
The Commonwealth appealed.
The Appeals Court affirmed.
II. The Issue: Did the First-Floor Warrant Authorize a Search of the Second Floor?
At first glance, the police argument seems intuitive: Hanson used both apartments as a single home; therefore, a warrant for his home should encompass the entire space.
But intuition collapses quickly under Article 14’s particularity requirement.
A warrant must:
describe the place to be searched, and
limit the search to that place and no more.
In multiunit dwellings, Massachusetts courts have been especially clear:
If police know—or should know—that a building contains more than one residence, they must specify which unit they want to search.
They did here: the first-floor apartment.
And that specificity matters.
III. The Controlling Law: Commonwealth v. Hall (1975)
The Appeals Court found the case controlled by Commonwealth v. Hall, 366 Mass. 790 (1975), a foundational decision in Massachusetts search-and-seizure law.
In Hall, police had a warrant for a single apartment but searched another unit inside the same building after learning it contained drugs. The SJC suppressed the evidence.
The principle:
Different apartments in a single building are as distinct as separate houses.
A warrant for one does not authorize a search of another.
This rule applies even if:
the defendant owns the whole building,
the apartments are internal to each other,
the police learn new information mid-search, or
probable cause develops for a different unit.
The police must stop, secure, and get a new warrant, unless exigent circumstances exist.
No exigency existed here.
IV. Why the Warrant Did Not Cover the Second Floor
1. The building was undisputedly a multiunit dwelling
Two mailboxes, separate entrances, and independent access points made this a classic two-family structure.
2. The warrant specifically limited the search to the first-floor apartment
This language is not accidental. When an officer writes “first-floor apartment,” he is telling the magistrate—and himself—what he wants permission to search.
3. The magistrate authorized a narrow search, not a broad one
The court emphasized that magistrates—not officers—define the scope of a search.
4. Police could have obtained a second warrant easily
Justice Wood highlighted that Hanson was in custody, the children were safe, and there was no risk of destruction of evidence. Police had time to pause and do the constitutionally required thing: apply for another warrant.
5. Using two units as a single home does not merge them into a single legal space
This is perhaps the most counterintuitive part for lay readers.
Even if the defendant treats the whole building as one home, the law treats separate apartments as separate constitutional spaces unless they are physically and legally integrated.
Here, they were not.
V. The Arguments the Commonwealth Made—and Why They Failed
The Commonwealth advanced several theories:
1. “We thought it was one home.”
Not good enough. Police knew the building was multiunit when they applied for the warrant.
2. “Probable cause existed for both floors.”
Probable cause does not expand the scope of a warrant. Only a judge can do that.
3. “The upstairs was part of the curtilage of the downstairs apartment.”
The court rejected this argument outright. Separate units are not each other’s curtilage.
4. “Other cases allowed expansion of the search area.”
Cases like Scala and Wallace involved attic spaces accessible only through the target unit—not separately numbered apartments with distinct entrances.
These were not comparable situations.
VI. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions
The opinion in Hanson is notable for containing a concurrence from Justice Grant and a dissent from Justice Hand—giving a fuller picture of the issues at stake.
Justice Grant (Concurring)
He agreed suppression was warranted but thought the majority overstated the constitutional requirement. In his view, the warrant requirement might have been satisfied by describing the premises as any part of the dwelling accessible by Hanson’s keys.
He would defer more to a flexible, use-based description.
Justice Hand (Dissenting)
Her dissent reflects a real and recurring tension in search-warrant law.
She argues:
The officers believed the defendant lived only in the first-floor apartment when they sought the warrant.
Probable cause existed for Hanson’s home, not a floor.
During execution, police learned Hanson used both apartments as a unified dwelling.
No third-party privacy interests were implicated.
The warrant should therefore be read “liberally” to encompass the whole living space.
She relies on dicta from Hall and cases where a secondary space—like an attic—was integral to the target unit.
It is a thoughtful dissent grounded in practicality and common sense, but the majority’s opinion hews more tightly to constitutional structure.
VII. The Practical Lessons of Hanson for Future Cases
This case offers several direct takeaways for lawyers, officers, and defendants.
1. Multiunit buildings require precision.
Police must specify which apartment they intend to search.
A warrant for “30 Golf Street” is not good enough.
A warrant for “first floor” does not include “second floor.”
2. Discovery of new facts mid-search does not expand authority.
Even if the officers reasonably discover that the defendant controls additional spaces, they must pause and obtain a new warrant unless exigency exists.
3. Use-based arguments rarely overcome structural reality.
Even if occupants treat two apartments as one home, the legal boundaries remain unless the spaces are physically integrated (e.g., attic connected only through an interior door).
4. If you want to search a second space, secure it and get a warrant.
Courts expect this step. Judges will suppress evidence if police skip it.
5. Suppression remains a powerful remedy.
In Hanson, suppression effectively dismantled the Commonwealth’s firearms case.
VIII. The Broader Constitutional Theme
The Fourth Amendment and Article 14 demand particularity not for formalism’s sake, but to prevent:
general searches,
officer discretion substituting for judicial oversight,
and the erosion of privacy through the back door of “good-faith” expansion.
This case illustrates the principle perfectly:
The warrant process is not optional, and the limits of a warrant are not negotiable.
The search of the second-floor apartment may have felt practical in the moment. It may have felt intuitive. But constitutional protections are not grounded in “feels right.” They are grounded in the precision of language and the discipline of procedure.
The police needed another warrant.
They did not get one.
The evidence is suppressed.
As it must be.
Conclusion
Commonwealth v. Hanson reinforces a clear and longstanding rule: When police want to search more than the warrant authorizes, they must stop and obtain judicial approval. Multiunit homes, even when used as a single residence, do not lose their constitutional boundaries simply because daily life flows across them.
This decision is a striking example of Article 14’s strength. In Massachusetts, the courts remain deeply committed to the idea that the home—however configured—remains the core of personal privacy. A warrant that identifies one apartment cannot be stretched to include another, even with the best of intentions.
And for anyone facing criminal charges arising from a residential search, the case is a reminder that the first question is always the same:
What exactly did the warrant authorize—and did the police go beyond it?
When they do, the courtroom offers a remedy.
If Police Searched More Than the Warrant Allowed, Your Rights May Have Been Violated
Search-and-seizure challenges often decide the outcome of a case. If the police exceeded the scope of a warrant, entered spaces they had no authority to search, or relied on mistaken assumptions about your home, the evidence may be suppressed—and the charges may fall.
Call Benzaken, Sheehan & Wood, LLP at (508) 897-0001.
We will review the warrant, analyze the search, and fight to have illegally obtained evidence thrown out.